the Anti-recessionary policy of the states in the conditions of economy monopolisation

One of characteristic certificates sotsioalteratsii modern economy is that fact, that the states are quite often compelled to interfere rigidly with market relations and to resort to such tools of an anti-recessionary policy, as complete or partial nationalisation of "problem" banks.

As already it was marked above, one of consequences of prompt monopolisation of a banking system is deepening of a system financial risk. It consists in threat of a collapse of bank sector, and behind it and all economy in case of bankruptcy of one or several large banks. As practice shows, in such conditions the state bodies are compelled to address rather roughly with the "sacred" market right of a private property.

In narrow sense nationalisation represents «lawful gosudarstvennoyovlastnyj the certificate consisting in the compulsory termination of the right of a private property on certain property complexes and (or) the right of private sharing in affairs and capitals of the organisation and occurrence of the property right to this property (the rights of sharing in affairs and capitals) at the state for the purpose of maintenance with the state of functionality of corresponding sector of economic system in extreme conditions (revolution, wars, crisis, etc.) »[177]. In wider treatment about nationalisation speak, as about any acquisition by the state of economic subjects or a significant share in them. As a rule, in the modern world nationalisation is made on the terms of adequate indemnification to the proprietor [178]. To practice of nationalisation of banking businesses, including and compulsory, in the last three-four decades addressed in many countries, in particular in days of Great recession. Most successfully these measures were applied in Sweden,
Therefore it is accepted to name such anti-recessionary model "Swedish" [179]. We will consider these examples in more details.

80 - 90th of last century were marked by the bank crisis which has amazed the countries of the Scandinavian region. First of all - Norway, Sweden and Finland. Crisis principal causes became financial sector liberalisation in the eighties, expansion of consumer crediting at actual cancellation of restrictions on issue of credits, prompt growth of a capital market. So, in Norway with 1984 on 1986 volume of the issued credits of dews on 30 % year [180]. In Sweden to the beginning 1990 this indicator has increased from 85 % to 135 % of gross national product of the country [181], and private savings were reduced to 7 % of gross national product [182]. Result of such succession of events became naduvanie "bubbles", including in the real estate market. In 1990 they have burst, that has caused chain reaction of crises of bank institutes and falling of economic activity. To the greatest degree Finland has suffered from crisis. It is enough to notice, that the rate of unemployment in Finland at the height of crisis has exceeded 19 % while in Sweden it has not reached 9 %-s' marks, and in Norway has made only 6 % [183]. Cumulative falling of gross national product of Finland has reached 10,1 %. Sweden has managed only 5 %-s' reduction, and Norway has lost only 0,1 % of gross national product [184].

In all these countries of the state played an active role in overcoming of crisis and applied similar measures of effect on economy.

In 1991 the second and third largest banks of Norway (Christiania Bank and Fokus Bank) have become bankrupt. The leader of branch (Den Norske Bank) has lost 90 % of the capital. Cumulative assets of three banks made 54 % from volume of assets of all bank sector [185]. During first time losses of banks were compensated from guarantee funds. Besides, practice of absorption of the small become bankrupt banks by larger financial institutions was actively applied. Then for the aid to guarantee funds the state declared creation of the State Bank Guarantee fund which capital was equaled 1,7 mlrd doll, (about 1,2 % of gross national product of Norway). The fund has received a call future
Shares of banks of Norway which are in the heaviest position then three greatest banks have undergone to actual nationalisation.

Later, when crisis has been overcome, the state has started to sell shares of banks gradually. Fokus Bank has been completely privatised in a short time in 1995 Christiania Bank it was sold longer time. Within several years the state started with necessity to reserve third of shares of financial institutions. However in 2000 the remained shares of bank have been sold group Nordea. As to Den norske Bank in 2015 the state participation share in it was equaled 34 % (in 2003-2004 of bank has united with Union Bank of Norway) [186]. Assisting banks suffering disaster, not podvergshimsja nationalisation, the state rigidly enough interfered with their affairs. To receive the state help, banks have been obliged to conduct management and board of directors replacement; to use the remained share capital first of all for cover of reserves; to reduce operational costs [187]. Such restrictions compelled banks to show the big ingenuity in the independent decision of their problems.

In 1991 the Swedish government has issued the credit to the largest bank of country Forsta Sparbanken on capital increase. Cumulative receipts have made nearby 1,3 mlrd dollars one Year later in turn behind the help to the state there were already tens banks, and the authorities have been compelled to go for more drastic measures.

First, the state declared the general warranty under obligations of banks in exchange for a share in their capital. The measure has been removed only in 1996 and has allowed to involve external financing from foreign banks. Secondly, the state has nationalised two banks from among the largest - Nordbanken and Gota bank. On them it was necessary about 24 % of the credits issued by bank sector and about 22 % of assets of branch [188]. Cover for losses for the account of share capitals of banks became a sanitation condition. After nationalisation Nordbanken from its assets have been allocated not profile, not concerning its primary activity (in sector of the real estate, production, building and sphere of services). For management of these assets the state has created so-called « Bad bank »Secumm, operated skilled experts. As a result doubtful assets managed to be realised gradually. For this purpose the state has poured in in the company 3,7 mlrd doll, as an ownership capital, and also has supplied with warranties for reception 1,7 more mlrd doll, as the credit [189]. It is important to notice, that the state did not redeem toxic assets at bank, and began to operate them already
After the bank has been nationalised. Such tactics has allowed to avoid difficulties at an estimation of "bad assets» at their repayment at banks: too the heavy price of purchase would pour out in unjustified waste of budgetary funds while too low would not bring to sinking banks of notable support. Thirdly, the state has resorted to selective rekapitalizatsii banks in which, according to a regulator, had chances of a survival, through increase in their internal funds. In such situation the state redeemed ordinary shares of bank. Otherwise bank buried or subjected to absorption.

These and other actions of the authorities of Sweden have allowed to cope in rather short time with expanding crisis and to localise it at early stages. In process of an exit from crisis the state has started to muse of sale of the nationalised bank assets. In 1995 34,5 % of shares Nordbanken have been privatised. In 2003 the state remains the largest shareholder of bank from shares in 19 % of shares [190]. In 2013 the remained 7 % of shares [191] have been sold bank Nordea (it has been created on the basis of a "good" share of assets dismembered Nordbanken). The government of Finland for struggle against crisis has allocated to banks the credit for the sum 3,5 mlrd doll [192]. As well as in Sweden, the Finnish authorities have created Fund of the state warranties which redeemed problem banks, and dangerous assets concentrated in «bad bank» - OHY Arsenal.

To partial nationalisation from Bank of Finland has undergone Skopbank - the special financial institutions executing a role central for the savings banks. Also the Fund of the state warranties has united assets 41 banks in uniform financial institutions Savings Bank of Finland. Besides, it has accepted responsibilities on assets management of small bank STS-Bank. In total the government of Finland has allocated for support of bank sector nearby 8,4 mlrd dollars

The bank crisis was finished in the mid-nineties. Then the decision on merge prijali two largest banks of Finland - Suomen Yhdyspankki and Kansallispankki. The new bank has received name Merita and subsequently became part Nordea. Thus, concentration of a banking system of the country has amplified after crisis.

Financial crisis in South East Asia 1996-1997 of became a serious call to economic. Preconditions to its development have developed during fast growth of economy in the countries concerning to so-called to "the Asian tigers». It has caused an active capital inflow in these countries, to growth of a public debt and private sector debts, bubbles in the market

The real estate etc.

In Japan the bank crisis was preceded by a financial liberalisation expressed in the form of cancellation of state regulation of interest rates, increases in limits at crediting and removal of restrictions on a bond market. Such policy has led to a competitiveness aggravation between banks which have considerably expanded crediting volumes, including SMB, domohozjajstv, construction firms. In the conditions of a rise in prices in the real estate market the "bubble" which has burst in 1989 Disbalansy was inflated were aggravated with shocks on equity market that has in many respects provoked fall in prices to the real estate [193].

Unlike the majority of similar histories, the sharp phase of a bank crisis in Japan has come with some delay, and up to 1997 crisis had the latent character. For lack of serious shocks, the country government practically did not accept measures to normalisation of affairs in bank sector. The state was limited to languid buying up of "bad" assets on a discount price that saved necessity rekapitalizatsii banks. Later such policy name «lost decade». In Indonesia crisis was showed in the form of an active capital outflow and prompt devaluation of the national currency. The rigid monetary policy of a regulator has led to deficiency of liquidity. The problem was aggravated with a high level of concentration of sector, a concentration of a significant part of assets in hands of a narrow circle of the largest investors, and also a wide circulation of corruption and the lobbyism reducing efficiency of protective measures.

In Republic Korea active growth of the companies and, as consequence, their intensive crediting from bank sector has resulted to that in 1997 the external corporate indebtedness of the country has reached 110 mlrd dollars Debt to equity ratio 30 of the largest chebolej (the financial and industrial groups of exclusive type which were in the property of certain families and under the uniform administrative and financial control) reached 600 %. Thus the volume of gold and exchange currency reserves of republic made only 30,5 mlrd dollars During currency interventions of the state ZVR were reduced for 7 mlrd dollars [194]

In everything mentioned above the countries, the states in this or that kind have resorted to nationalisation of problem banks. In Japan to drastic measures the state has passed only after in 1997 bankrupts had been declared some the largest financial institutions, including assurance company Nissan Life Insurance and bank Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. The authorities declared the general warranty under deposits and rekapitalizatsii banks. The last measure consisted that specially created Commission on Financial Reconstruction conducted inspection of banks, and then made the decision about rekapitalizatsii.

Granting by bank «the plan on business restoration» was its obligatory condition. The state bought up preference shares and thus received the effective tool on effect on establishment management.

The banks, were most close to a bankruptcy condition, It has been decided to nationalise in 1998 there were two largest banks of country Nippon Credit Bank and Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan [195]. After normalisation of assets they have been again privatised in 2000 And and Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan has got American Ripplewood Holdings, that became the first foreign absorption of the Japanese bank. The anti-recessionary policy has yielded the fruits: 2006 the volume of transient debts in a banking system of Japan has fallen in 43 times. The total amount of fiscal expenses has made about 24 % of gross national product of the country [196].

The authorities of Indonesia within the limits of the anti-recessionary policy resorted to liquidation, nationalisation and rekapitalizatsii financial institutions. In total 64 weak banks have been liquidated. However because of active pressure from lobbyists the regulator could not close all problem institutes. Besides, the methodology of definition of viability of banks was opaque. Such actions have only aggravated crisis, having provoked attacks of clients on banks.

Management rekapitalizatsiej banks was entrusted to Agency on re-structuring of banks which has booked audit of all banks, having divided them on a solvency category, proceeding from factor of covering of risk. The weakest were exposed to liquidation or merge. Healthy - are granted to itself. Banks with average indexes have been re-structured. It is characteristic, that national banks have undergone to re-structuring even being in the weakest group. The reason for that is system risk which was expressed that national banks had 50 % assets of the market. In 1998 the state has nationalised 13 large banks [197]. Except unwillingness or absence of possibilities of their shareholders to capitalise banks, the state moved fear before all the same system risk. As a whole the exit from crisis has managed Indonesia in the sum, comparable from 55 % of gross national product that there were a consequence not so much problems in the anti-recessionary policy, how many contradictions of a political system of the country.

The republic Korea in the history repeatedly resorted to nationalisation of bank sector. In 1961 all banking system of the country has passed under the state control. This measure became a part of policy Pak Chonhi on transformation of a national economy from a condition backward agrarian to a front line industrial. In rough economic growth banks have been again privatised in the early eighties. Nevertheless the state saved the control over many banks through significant shares in their share capital. In days of the Asian crisis the state allocated means for support to only solvent institutes with certain level of sufficiency of the capital. Also the general warranty under bank obligations has been entered. With a problem of "bad" assets it was possible to consult thanks to establishment of the Korean company on assets management. The state redeemed "bad" debts below their book value. It promoted occurrence of the private market of "bad" debts. Simultaneously the state, proceeding from IMF requests, has taken unprecedented measures on liberalisation of bank sector, having admitted in it the foreign capital. As a result the market share of the banks belonging to the foreign capital, by 2005 has grown with 7 to 30 % [198]. Nationalisation of two largest Korean banks became the important anti-recessionary step, whose bankruptcy could strike strong blow to stability of all banking system. Simultaneously 5 small banks have been liquidated. Then, in 2000 the state has started the second stage of nationalisation not to admit destruction of fragile balance which managed to be reached in economy. As a result in the state property there were already 8 banks, and the cumulative share of the state in bank assets of Korea has reached 54 % [199]

Nationalisation of banks has essentially simplified their procedure rekapitalizatsii and the repayment of "bad" assets. This measure promoted sector stabilisation, but has managed heavy expenses for the tax bearers, equivalent 30 % of gross national product of Korea. This crisis became one of the last decades most expensive in history in the world [200]. Using the power in the market of bank services, the state began to promote its concentration actively. The total of business banks in the country has decreased with 27 to 13 in 2007 In 2005 3 largest banks of the country supervised 63 % of assets of all branch [201]. Concentration has affected increase of efficiency of branch. If in 1997 less than half of banks of the country corresponded to the specification of sufficiency of the capital at level of 8 % by 2005 the average factor of sufficiency has reached 12,5 %. The share of loans with the raised risk has decreased for that
The period from 7,2 % to 1,3 %. Levels of profitableness and profitability of banks have increased in tens times [202]. After overcoming of crisis of the power of Korea constantly declared desire to privatise Woori Finance Holdings. However in 2014 57 % of shares of the largest financial holding company of the country remained in the property of the state [203]. To sale have undergone a number of the banks nationalised in days of crisis. However it is necessary to take into consideration that fact, that privatisation and attraction of external investors did not become, contrary to the point of view traditional for market fundamentalism, the key driver of this growth. Moreover, Republic Korea national banks have proved to be more successful in days of crisis and during the postcrisis period, than private and belonging to the foreign capital.

So, from 2001 on 2005 of the state holding Woori Finance Holdings has advanced all competitors on such indicators, as sufficiency of the capital, profitability of assets and profitability of the capital. The company has shown one of the best results on a share of risky credits and growth of volumes of crediting of economy [204]. Arrival to bank sector of Korea of the foreign capital has doubly affected stability of a national economy as a whole. On the one hand, such banks have not issued fabulous credits to industrially-financial groups (that has led to crisis 1990). Thereby link developing by years between cheboljami and banks through the state which used administrative levers for crediting of monopolies has been broken. On the other hand, foreign banks have concentrated on aggressive grab of the market of buyer's credits, promptly expanding it. The precipitate credit policy and weak estimation of risks have led to development of "crisis of credit cards» in 2003 In the market of consumer crediting big "bubble" was inflated. 10 % of the population could not reset credits on cards [205].

The state had to interfere again with a situation, rescuing the largest operator of credit cards LG-Card budgetary payments. It is characteristic, that in the conditions of crisis national banks have accepted active sharing in a rescue government program LG - Card and sectors as a whole. While foreign banks have evaded from cooperation, despite preliminary agreements. Thus, the state nevertheless has gone on privatisation of the majority of banks and attraction of the foreign capital. What for it has been made? Obviously, not only from economic efficiency reasons as the financial institutions operated the state, showed more successful
Results. According to a number of experts [206], the reason of bank privatisation laid partly in a political plane. To such step the Korean authorities were pushed by belief in the big efficiency of a private property in comparison with the state; desire to limit the exclusive power chebolej; pressure from IMF. Thus, from experience of the Korean crisis it is possible to draw the important conclusion that the private property in modern conditions at least not always appears more effective, than state. Transformation of bank sector of Korea into the independent business focused on profit taking, had the price. Increase of profitableness of bank sector has led to a loss of work of bank as a conductor of savings in the investment: industry crediting, in t.ch small and average business, was essentially reduced. Also privatisation has not led to overcoming of "moral risk» and did not guarantee protection against financial bubbles.

In days of financial crisis 2008-2009 of the state actively resorted to practice of nationalisation of banks. In such countries as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, the Great Britain and the USA nationalisation was applied so actively, as well as liquidity support, rekapitalizatsija banks, the state warranty under bank obligations. [207] typical nationalisation is is system significant financial institutions in which the state receives the greatest share of the capital.

In such countries as France, Greece, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland regulators were limited to softer measures - submission of liquidity and warranties under obligations of bank sector [208]. In the Great Britain the state as an anti-recessionary measure used the scheme of granting of liquidity to banks through the mechanism of a swap of the securities supplied with the mortgage, on gos. Bonds within 3 years. Also the state granted banks moneys at short notice on the security of assets and has given signal to start to the program of protection of assets in which frameworks banks had an opportunity to acquire warranties from losses over the established level on certain asset classes. In 2008 one of the largest mortgage banks of Great Britain Northern Rock has been nationalised, which regulator tried to rescue through administration of guarantees under deposits. After the bank indebtedness
Before the Central Bank has reached 27 mlrd pounds [209], the decision on nationalisation was accepted. In 2010 the bank has been divided into two establishments, in one of which (Northern Rock) "good" assets of bank with sale prospect to private investors, and in other (Northern Rock Asset Management) - "bad", including transient real estates have been concentrated. Later in 2012 Northern Rock has been privatised by company Virgin Money.

Partial nationalisation bank Bradford and Bingley has been subjected. The state has withdrawn hypothecary business of bank without indemnification to proprietors. The rest, including a branch network, has been sold Spanish Santander Group. In a course rekapitalizatsii in the state property there were 82 % of shares Royal Bank of Scotland [210] which has replaced the chairman of board of directors and the president of bank. Also the state has received a share in 44 % in capital Lloyds Banking Group which has been merged with HBOS. Later during privatisation this share has been lowered to 14 % [211]. Some details of financial crisis in the USA were resulted above. Now we will notice, that the state has undertaken a number of serious measures for situation stabilisation in a financial sector. It is possible to carry the program of purchase of problem assets to them (TARP) and capital supports (SAR), lodging of security on assets of bank Citigroup, the assertion of the plan of financial stability, establishment of the private-state funds under the repayment of assets (RRGR), and also realisation of reform of regulation of a financial sector. In total with 2007 on 2010 g FRS within the limits of various programs of the emergency help has allocated to banks of means for the sum 16,1 trln doll [212].

Earlier, in the spring of 2008, the state has been compelled to take external management over two largest hypothecary agencies with state sharing: Fannie May and Freddie Mas. For support of their credit status the Exchequer has carried out injections in these companies for the sum in 200 mlrd doll [213]. In the insurance market - corporations AIG - the state has issued to one of the basic players the credit for a total sum in 85 mlrd doll, in exchange for 80 % of shares. The government of Germany also has resorted to intervention in bank sector. In the spring of 2009 the Bundestag has approved the administration bill of compulsory nationalisation of tanks, whose condition
It is evaluated as close to bankruptcy [214]. He has allowed the government to conduct ekspropriatsiju bank shares in case the consent with shareholders of a financial institution will not be reached. Obligatory privatisation of the nationalised banks in process of their financial improvement became the important condition of the law. Actually, the law had a special-purpose character and started to allow the state to receive the control over Hypo Real Estate - the largest financial institutions of Germany, taking an active position including in the hypothecary market of the USA. By then its losses for the last year have made 5,5 mlrd euro. Before the country power have already allocated for support it is system significant holding 102 mlrd euro, however these measures have not led to desirable result.

Besides, the state has acquired blocking block of shares of bank Commerzbank. In 2014 the state possessed 17 % of its shares [215]. In 2015 Hypo Real Estate still remained in hands of the state of Germany, however it continues to get rid of assets. So, Hypo Real Estate has exhibited on sale of 100 % of shares of bank Deutsche Pfandbriefbank belonging to it [216]. Active sharing of the state in rescue of the private companies concerns mainly a financial sector. However in history of the last years similar examples arose and in production. Most illustrative of them - bankruptcy of the largest motor-car manufacturer in corporation General Motors world. US authorities have granted the companies anti-recessionary credits almost on 49,5 mlrd dollars, having received instead of 61 % of its shares. It was absolutely necessary measure as, by estimations of the western experts, bankruptcy GM would pour out in loss of 1,9 million jobs in 2009-2010 And the budget would lose 40 mlrd doll, receiving less tax revenues and issuing unemployment benefits and food coupons. In process of an exit from crisis the state gradually privatised the company. December, 2013 the state has sold the last 2 % of shares General Motors [217].

Thus, practice shows, that the states are compelled to resort to active interference in activity of the private companies in the conditions of an economic crisis. This practice discredits the myth extended in company, which R.S.Grinberg has formulated as follows: «proof submission, that in the modern world the nations to which managed to reduce to a minimum a state participation in flourish
To economy »[218]. The economic theory of neoliberalism dominating in the world, recognising some necessary role of the state in economy, with disapproval concerns its interference in affairs of private business. The leader of German school of neoliberalism V.Ojken as a whole reduced a state policy role to maintenance of competition of the market environment. For this purpose, in its opinion, the state should supervise inflation and deflation processes; to liquidate negative social consequences of market shocks; to condition, interfering formation of monopolies; to guarantee private property freedom; to supply freedom and an openness of the markets [219]. The program of representatives of the current, designated on conference Paris in 1938 Its main principles generalises an item of neoliberalism concerning a state role in economy, are reduced to the following: The state should define rules and borders in which the market relations based on free movement of capitals and the goods will develop, and also to watch their observance. The state should support a free competitiveness and interfere with formation of monopolies. Interference of the state in economy is supposed only in cases when there is impossible an operative returning of the market to balance on the basis of price range, for example, in war [220].

However, as practice shows, in the conditions of state crisis are compelled to interfere actively with activity of monopolies, including for... Protection of these monopolies, not supposing their ruin. Neoliberals, opposing economy monopolisations, thus object to direct effect on them. Ojken the aspiration to the exclusive power fights for that the state conditioned, hindering occurrence of monopolies and by that beating off at them. « The control over activity of monopolies in the conditions of a competitive order should be so resolute to have strong preventive effect », - the economist [221] marks, considering, that thus« occurrence of monopolistically power structures is prevented. And it is reached not only an establishment of interdictions for formation of cartels, but also, that it is much more important, realisation ekoyonomicheskoj and legal politicians who by use konstituirujushchih principles opens the way of the powerful forces of a competitiveness existing in modern economy »[222].

Thus Ojken it is assured what supply such control the state can small forces: «actually the control over monopolies is limited rather to the few
The valid monopolies. Therefore the establishment on affairs of monopolies should not be the huge organisation with the big officialdom »223. In the end the antimonopoly theory of neoliberals is reduced not to struggle against monopolies, and to attempt"to neutralise"the dominating companies which in the conditions of state regulation will be compelled to act how if they existed in the conditions of a free competitiveness.« The economic policy should be directed first of all not against abusings of existing power structures, and is direct against occurrence of those in general »[223], - writes Ojken and by that actually opposes open market and competitiveness principles on which protection he tries to stand. As monopolies are born in competition, to complicate their occurrence - means essentially to limit a competitiveness.

The greatest productive possibilities, the most prepared shots, wide access to the credit and resources and, in the end, possibility to supersede from the market of the competitors - all has it the strongest player. It is characteristic, that the company can achieve the domination in quite "fair" method, i.e. without use of dishonest methods of struggle, such as «« the fighting prices », lock-outs, discounts from the prices, represented for long business ties, etc.» [224] (however, last hardly it it is possible to carry to not competitive methods of struggle as discounts are the compelled payment of the market participant for stability and some reliance of the future). To take away hands of the state possibility of the leader to take advantage of victory fruits - means to deprive the private company of the important stimulus to development. In it one of the important contradictions of market economy is covered.

Objective conditions of modern economic development force the states to interfere actively with affairs of monopolies, to rescue them, not supposing ruin. The course of an economic crisis also introduces the investment in strengthening of monopolisation of economy as gives possibility to the corporate giants more strong standing standing, to buy up and establish the control over small disaster small and average corporations. Within the last decades the scale of interference of the states in economic relations has essentially grown in all capitalist countries. The modern market economy represents the model hardly differing from those that dominated in the world still 80 years ago. As V.A.Ivanov marks, «the modern states of the developed capitalist countries accept functions of the control over a rate of exploitation, behind rate of return and it
Validity, behind crediting and grants, behind level of a subsistence, level of a minimum payment, etc. They supervise to 40 % of prices of goods, withdraw from private holders significant, and sometimes even the large part of profit and redistribute it in favour of company as a whole »[225].

In the USA the state through graduated taxation system withdraws about 60 % of profit from monopolies. In countries of Northern Europe this indicator reaches 80 %. Thereby the state «socialises results of private production» [226]. Besides, in the most developed countries entering in OESR, about half of gross national product it is distributed through a public finance while 100 years ago this indicator did not exceed 10 % [227]. As the American economist M.Rotbard marks: « The state slowly, but truly took in hand control levers a monetary system, first, to pump up economy substitutes of money at own discretion, secondly, to pass to socialist management of all economy »[228]. This phenomenon speaks completely not high ideals of humanism which officers of the developed countries of the world are guided by. The modern state is compelled to go for such steps as the economy cannot is effective function and develop differently. The actions of the state directed on softening of consequences of a social inequality, are a necessary condition for science development through providing of access to various strata of society to higher education; for labour efficiency growth through increase of social stability and expansion of social warranties for workers. Here, however, it is necessary to notice, that more expressed social orientation of internal policy of the most developed countries of the world is, except other, a consequence of that these countries have sufficient for this purpose the resources which have been accumulated including thanks to operation of periphery of world capitalist system [229].

However the state policy actively applied today, in practice does not promote the permission of fundamental contradictions of modern economic development, including in a cut of monopolisation of economy and system risk. The state compelled directly to interfere with market processes for struggle against crises, only
Plays a "fire-fighting crew" role, liquidating crisis consequences. After that the nationalised enterprises are transmitted again to a private property, than the status quo is restored. In the end assets remain at the command of the same class of large proprietors, only changing an accessory to its this or that clan. As a matter of fact, the state executes function of an assurance company of a private sector, restoring market stability for the account of means of tax bearers. As a rule, such succession of events is accompanied by essential reduction of state costs including within the limits of an austerity policy that affects quality of social security of the population, conducts to deepening of an inequality and process of economic growth [230] brakes. Such policy as a result leads to that consequences of crises are shouldered the worker of the population. In the western scientific literature for the characteristic of such tendency the corresponding term has been entered: « privatising profits and socialising losses »(privatisation of incomes and socialisation of losses). This problem has received the big resonance, becoming a theme of wide discussion. The greatest criticism such tool of the state effect on the market, as bail-out (an emergency grant-in-aid was exposed to the companies from the state).« If tax bearers introduce the investment in rescue of campaigns from bankruptcy, they should be rewarded for the account of the future profit for the fact that accept such risk », - American senator B.Sanders [231] considers.

Besides, the policy of rescue of banks from the state in even bolshej degrees generates moral risk. According to American economist A.Grinspena, «bankruptcy is the integral and necessary part of a market mechanism» [232]. Hence, he considers, the state should not stir to ruin of banks as punishment for unduly risky policy. Such point of view, at first sight, is quite logical: the risk of bankruptcy is good stimulus to an order and discipline in the market. However in practice realisation of such approach is impossible. The reason for that is noted earlier vzaimouvjazannost financial institutions as one of the parties finansializatsii economy. Ruin even average bank represents serious risk for stability of all system, let alone financial giants of exclusive type. Their rescue is, actually, obligatory for the state.

In days of Great recession for regulators was available only two variants of actions concerning corporations suffering disaster: emergency financing for the account of tax bearers or the inactivity conducting with high probability to crash of a banking system and, as consequence, of all economy of the country. The last years even more often there are conversations on introduction of one more tool of stabilisation of a financial system in the conditions of crisis. It has received the name bail-in and was already repeatedly discussed at the highest level, including at meetings G20 and specially created Advice on financial stability. Its essence consists in compulsory converting of requests of creditors in subordinirovannye loans or ustavnyj the bank capital. Such practice has been applied for the first time during a bank crisis on Cyprus in 2012 g when debenture holders of banks and deposits for the sum more than 100 thousand euro have been compelled to write off a part of debts and by that have been included in process of rescue of banks [233]. The European central bank plans to introduce this mechanism till 2018

To state the reasonable estimation of efficiency of such mechanism with t.z. Permissions of system contradictions of modern economy while it is inconvenient. However that fact is abundantly clear, that the history of market crises compels the states to go for such rough attempt at open market traditional values. The vicious circle to which the capitalism economy has got is received. On the one hand, its corner principles have generated drastic contradictions in economic development. With other - overcoming of these contradictions in the end conducts to the increasing negation of these principles.


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A source: Komolov Oleg Olegovich. TRENDS OF MONOPOLIZATION OF THE MODERN MARKET ECONOMY (POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECT). Thesis for the degree of candidate of economic sciences. Moscow - 2016. 2016

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  2. System of indicators of an estimation of activity of the noncommercial organisations in the conditions of realisation of anti-recessionary strategy of development
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  10. the Maintenance of system of anti-recessionary management of banks of commerce and its development at the present stage
  11. Algorithm of acceptance of the administrative decision for choice anti-recessionary strategy of development of the noncommercial organisation
  12. 3.1 Use of criteria of stability in working out of programs of anti-recessionary bank management
  13. the Analysis of practice of anti-recessionary management of regional banks of the Orenburg area
  15. Chapter 1 Theoretical bases of anti-recessionary management of banks of commerce
  16. 3.1 Methodical approach to strategic management of the noncommercial organisation with use of tools of preventive anti-recessionary management
  17. Chapter 3. Development and perfection of the mechanism of anti-recessionary management by banks of commerce
  18. Efficiency of activity of Agency on re-structuring of the credit organisations of the Russian Federation in the field of anti-recessionary management