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1.2.3. Mutual relations between large and small shareholders


Unlike mutual relation between small shareholders and the manager,
Mutual relations between large and small shareholders are not issued kakimlibo by the contract, the agreement. These mutual relations – as a matter of fact mutual relations between members of one collective, that is between formally equal by position
Economic agents – proprietors.

As it has been indicated above, interests of large and small shareholders do not coincide
Or, at least, coincide not completely.
For example, large shareholders are not interested in reception of dividends, and
Also sometimes and in market value growth if the capital market is not interesting to the given category of shareholders, and the market of merges and absorption not ðàçâèò.33
The reasons of absence of such interests – that large shareholders are capable
To extract benefits from activity of the enterprise by different ways. For example, by
Monitoring of cash flows.
Really, large shareholder having, for example, of 60 %-s' shares in the capital, is capable to define almost any decisions, that is actually to dispose of all volume of property of the enterprise, having usurped, thereby, the rights of holders
The others of 40 % of shares. Differently, such shareholder has practically 100 %
From total amount of the rights of the control and only 60 % from total amount of the rights to the monetary
Streams. The source of conflicts consists in it between large and small shareholders.
To aggravation of a problem of a conflictness of interests between large and small
Shareholders the unequal quantity of the voices falling to one share promotes. If in one countries (for example, in Brazil, Greece, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Japan
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) The principle «one share – one voice», in others is fixed
(These countries the majority: for example, in Belgium, the Great Britain, Germany, Israel,
Spain, the USA, France
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) There is a possibility behind a part of ordinary shares
To fix more than one voice on one share.
The differentiation of quantity of voices on one share, as a rule, occurs
On the basis of duration of possession: "older" shareholders (for example, founders, enterprise founders) receive more voices on one share, or on
To basis of volume of the block of shares: the more largely the package, the more voices is necessary on
One share. We will admit, the large shareholder is the holder of 35 % of shares, on each of which it is necessary 2 voices. In this case almost absolute control
(About 52 % of voices (35x2 / (35x2+65x1)) over the enterprise it is supported only 30 % from
Total amount of the rights to cash flows.

41
La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. W. Law and Finance//Journal of Political Economy. – 1998. – ¹ 106. – pp. 1113-1155.
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There æå.34
Large shareholders, extracting advantages from great volume of the rights of the control,
Can supply acceptance by the enterprise of such decisions which will answer
To exclusively their interests, instead of interests of all shareholders.
Type transaktsionnyh the costs, the most peculiar to the given mutual relation are the costs of collective decision-making expressed in acceptance
Not optimum decisions; the decisions infringing interests of one shareholders to please
Other.
transaktsionnye costs of the given mutual relation in value terms
Can be equal to decrease in volume of cash flows (dividends and a market value gain) up to complete depreciation of investments of small shareholders.
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A source: Losev Sergey Vladimirovich. Issuance of corporate securities and transaction costs: Questions of theory and practice. Thesis for the degree of candidate of economic sciences. Moscow - 2001. 2001

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  2. 1.2.5. Mutual relations between shareholders and creditors – bondholders
  3. 2.3. Management of mutual relations in an enterprise network of small enterprises franchajzingovogo type
  4. 1.2. Mutual relations between economic agents in the course of a corporate governance the enterprise and transaktsionnye costs of investors 1.2.1. Structure of economic agents and a basis of their mutual relations
  5. § 2. The rights of shareholders at fulfilment by a society of large transactions and transactions with interest
  6. § 3.1. Participation of subjects of small business in arbitration disputes in quality minoritarnyh shareholders
  7. 1.2.4. Mutual relations between the manager and bondholders
  8. 5.1. The General characteristic of mutual relations in the field of culture
  9. Mutual relations of the state court and arbitration
  10. §3. «Legal features of mutual relations of the multinational corporation and the accepting state»