§ 4. Value of domestic constitutionalism of second half XIX - the beginnings of the XX-th century for modern Russian statehood

All above-stated features of domestic constitutionalism of second half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings have been interconnected with conditions of statement and the decision of the constitutional question in Russia that time, and also predetermined by the Russian legal doctrine and statehood of that time.

Dogmatism of domestic scientists, them paradigmalnaja dependence on experience of the state building of other countries (France or Germany), and also from ratsionalizatsy the archetypes of the constitutional sense of justice developed in other social and historical conditions, have predetermined that they could not show, on the one hand, possibility of expression of base values of Russian people in the constitutional terms, and with another - to develop the effective policy of transition from an absolute monarchy mode to the constitutional state. In other words, really having faced a problem of the reception constitutional publichnopravovyh institutes in the conditions of domination of archetypes of traditional (autocratic) sense of justice, both among dominating elite, and among the people, they could not give its satisfactory decision neither theoretically, nor practically.

Certainly, it is possible to agree with A.N.Medushevsky that «Russian liberalism of a boundary XIX - the XX-th centuries (as well as western same time) identified democracy with a parliamentary mode which could be realised in the form of the constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy or in parliamentary republics». [638] But as we have shown above, the imaginary constitutionalism in its Russian variant was expressed in filling of the constitutional institutes by the autocratic maintenance. The problem consisted in rationalising base values of Russian people by means of archetypes of the constitutional sense of justice. [639] and only on the basis of such aksiologicheskogo synthesis was possible to carry out the reception of the constitutional public institutes. Installation of the Russian constitutionalists of second half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings that in all countries the national sense of justice through the mechanism of parliamentary democracy will be demonstrated equally, was erroneous. [640 [641]

Actually process of the reception of the constitutional archetypes and institutes everywhere occupied long time and had no linear character. M.M.Kovalevsky who wrote thereupon the following has paid attention to it still: «Speech never went about complete transferring - to the United States of America or on continent of Europe - English parliamentarism, and about the adaptation of system of national representation and a constitutional monarchy to the societies strongly democratised by the revolutionary doctrine and at the same time far not torn all communications with the past, not developed in itself of the self-management habit, internally doubled by class partitions and not lost still predilection for the strong power and governmental


To guardianship ».

If we address to history we will find out, what even in the USA, despite cultural affinity to the native land of the constitutional sense of justice - England, the reception of archetypes of the constitutional sense of justice has demanded pozitivizatsii corresponding publichnopravovyh institutes (as a matter of fact, therefore and there was an idea of the Constitution as the organic law).

And this process has occupied about hundred years, since revolution of 1776 and finishing cancellation of slavery in the south of the USA after civil war of 1861-1865. And about hundred after that occurred implementatsija values of the constitutional sense of justice by means of legislative positive discrimination concerning socially weak groups and minority.

Has similarly put was and in France it was required which almost hundred years, since the Great revolution of the 1789 which has given some classical constitutional formulas, and finishing establishment of the Third republic in 1875. For this time France has passed through civil wars, horrors jakobinskogo terror, Napoleon's I authoritarianism, restoration of monarchy Burbonov and Napoleon's III who have become first plebistsitarnym by the emperor lzhe-constitutionalism. About the same picture we will see, if we will address to constitutionalism history in Germany which solved simultaneously problems on creation of the uniform state and implementatsii values of the constitutional sense of justice. This process has conditionally begun in 1848 with the so-called Frankfurt revolutionary constitution, developed through acceptance of the pseudo-constitutional certificates by the numerous German

The states, then through the Constitution of the German empire of the 1871 which has invested with legal forms imaginary constitutionalism, and also through blossoming and  destruction of the Weimar republic (1919 - 1933). And only after acceptance of the Constitution of Germany in 1949 it is possible to speak about steady constitutional development of Germany. [642]

Despite such historical background, the Russian constitutionalists of second half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings were why - that are convinced that in Russia this process will be transient and successful. Though the same M.M.Kovalevsky underlined, that the essence of process of the reception of legal institutions consists not in their mechanical copying. He wrote the following in this occasion: «the State life of the separate countries and the people develops not under the influence of one independent growth of the establishments inherited from ancestors. It is not so much loan, how many adaptation of the overseas usages recognised at present exemplary, always played and continues to play a considerable role in the public law as much, how many and in civil». [643 [644]

In what value of ideas of the Russian constitutionalism of second half XIX - the beginnings of the XX-th century for modern Russian statehood consists? According to A.N.Medushevsky, «the political program of classical Russian liberalism is quite conformable to problems of Post-Soviet constitutional struggle for a lawful state». However from this follows, that the constitutional question and remained unresolved in modern Russia. And it despite acceptance in 1993 of the most democratic in the Russian history of the Constitution. As well as our great predecessors, we in the late eighties have faced the last century a problem how to carry out implementatsiju the constitutional values and institutes in a society fabric in which more than seventy years choked any private and public autonomy. In our opinion, value of ideas of the Russian constitutionalism of second half XIX - the beginnings of the XX-th century for modern Russian statehood consists in showing, how it is not necessary to carry out the reception of values and institutes.

The problem of the reception of the right is one of the most debatable in domestic jurisprudence. And if speech comes about private-law sphere there is a certain consensus about the main line of the reception of the Roman Law but when the public sphere starts to be discussed, the discussion degree sometimes reads off scale. On the one hand, still S.Monteske has written in due time: « Each people have own state system; English is a state system of Englishmen and if have wanted to give to its Prussians, it would be so absurd, as the decision to give the Prussian state to Turkis. Each state system is only a product, demonstration of own spirit of the given people and a step of development of consciousness of its spirit ». [645] On the other hand, development of legal bases of the Russian state is connected, since time of acceptance of Christianity, with the reception of public institutes. In what feature of the present stage of development of the constitutional ideas in our country? The modern Russian dominating elite is convinced, that a policy of the western countries, in words, standing up for cooperation equal in rights and partnership with Russia and others «again formed democracies», for their prompt "returning" in a western civilisation, is in practice directed on political and the acculturation of these states expressed «at the best to protection strategy, vrazumlenija or is simple ignoring of Russia, and in the worst - pressure, discrimination and rough political, economic and even military dictatorship». [646] In these conditions the destiny of modern Russian constitutionalism causes alarm. Even the same is social-legal phenomena, for example, the property, the form of government included in various contexts of historical, national, psychological features of the given country, can have opposite effects. Using «texts from another's culture» leads to new interpretation of these "brought" texts and the context "aborigenskoj" cultures. The new senses realised in human activity inevitably grow from such new interpretation. [647 [648] It is represented, that something similar happens and with constitutionalism on the Russian soil.

In modern Russian legal science a problem of the reception of public institutes and constitutionalism archetypes

It is comprehended in the form of a question on mutual relation of constitutionalism and the state (constitutional) right. V.T.Kabyshev and T.M.Prjahina thereupon consider, that «in a constitutional law science the constitutionalism is understood as direct action of the Constitution in the constitutional regulation of a political system and a political mode, the constitutional recognition of the rights and personal freedoms, legal character of mutual relations of the citizen and the state». But how probably direct action of the Organic law if there is no consensus concerning values in it fixed? It is obvious, that in this case the rights there will be who has more than competences.

I.A.Kravets, allocates following signs of the Russian constitutionalism: more later legal formation in comparison with other European states; transitive character of a modern condition, in communication, with what many principles of constitutionalism, having received konstitutsionno-legal registration, are not provided yet by wide public support and in the course of realisation often lose quality normativnosti; in it it is inherent tselepolaganie in much bolshej degrees, than to the democratic states with stable constitutional system etc. [649] Also, in its opinion, it is necessary to allocate as the most important following aspects of interrelation of constitutionalism and a constitutional law: ideological, historical, standard and sotsiokulturnyj. [650]

The ideological aspect is capable to reveal influence of ideas of constitutionalism on process of formation, development and a modern condition of the Russian constitutionalism. Them it implicitly follows, that last essentially differs from base principles of the constitutional sense of justice. However, the answer to a question in what these differences consist, at the given author we will not find.

The historical aspect opens genesis of konstitutsionno-legal certificates, institutes and principles in which course gradually or in a revolutionary way there is a change of types and historical forms of the Russian constitutionalism. In this case at I.A.Kravets it turns out, that the Russian constitutionalism some times during the historical development changed institutes and principles. There is a question, how much legally speaks about development of the same phenomenon if during that initial principles vary. Hence, or it is a question already of different phenomena, it is consecutive (peacefully or violently) replacing each other, or constitutionalism principles if their change without change of a being of the phenomenon is supposed are incorrectly allocated.

The standard aspect at I.A.Kravets formulates an ideal of the constitutional development of the country whereas positive normativnost constitutionalism it is limited to an establishment of obligatory rules of behaviour in the constitutional legislation of the country. Therefore property positivistic normativnosti gets constitutionalism thanks to principles and the rules fixed in the constitution and other legal acts. It is obvious, that in this case it is a question of influence of values of the constitutional sense of justice on legal registration of system of the government in a broad sense this concept. And from this point of view for avoiding of tautological use of concept normativnosti, it is expedient to discriminate values (archetypes)

The constitutional sense of justice (or simply constitutionalism) and state law system. Then it becomes clear, that deontologija constitutionalism it is connected with values of sense of justice, and them pozitivatsija is process implementatsii norms expressing and fixing them in state law system.

Important I.A.Kravtsom's allocation sotsiokulturnogo aspect which traces communication of constitutionalism with legal culture and legal consciousness of certain classes and all society as a whole is represented. Without understanding of features of sense of justice of dominating elite, intellectuals, other social strata it is impossible to develop effective strategy implementatsii values of the constitutional sense of justice in a social being fabric. [651]

Thus, it is necessary to discriminate accurately constitutionalism as the theoretical form of sense of justice and constitutionalism as positive law system. The first appears influence on the second which for simplicity we and name state law. The essence of this influence is reduced to that values of the constitutional sense of justice set criterion of an estimation of operating state law. At a stage of the origin and formation these values did it during statement and the decision of the constitutional question. And their further rationalisation became an internal source of development of constitutionalism. And from this point of view, without implementatsii values of the constitutional sense of justice in the form of the norms constituting corresponding publichnopravovye institutes, in system of state law the reception turns to a way of legitimation of dominating elite. In other words, the reception of public institutes in strict sense of this word is process of rationalisation of base archetypes of national sense of justice in categories and through a prism of values of the borrowed form of sense of justice. Be successful the reception publichnopravovyh institutes should to follow this rationalisation, instead of to precede it. Otherwise there is a risk of that new institutes will be assimilated by old archetypes of sense of justice. [652]

To understand it it is especially important, if we take into consideration the following remark of the known Australian jurist (with Russian roots) E.Kamenki: « Modern lines in sphere of the right and modern crisis of legal ideas consist in the semirealized confrontation of three great paradigms of public ideology, public organisation, the right and management. Each of them gives difficult, but as a result an integral image of the person, social institutes and their place in a society. These three paradigms: paradigm Gemeinschaft, or organic obshchinno-family, paradigm Gesellschaft, or contract trading-individualistic, and a paradigm administrativnobjurokraticheskaja ». [653] As is known, classical definition of concept a paradigm, offered T.Kunom, included principles of a formulation of scientific problems and ways of their decision, feature of construction of knowledge and the general for certain scientific community the teoretiko-methodological bases of scientific search that provides consistency of process of knowledge within the given paradigm. [654 [655] some modern Russian lawyers, for example, V.S.Nersesjants and


V.V. Lapaeva identify concepts of a paradigm and pravoponimanija. Others, for example, V.P.Malakhov, give a priority to concept «legal culture». [656] We prefer to speak about values (archetypes)

Sense of justice for following reasons. First, concept

Sense of justice expresses essence of a phenomenon of the right as original unity of reason (doctrines and dogmas), will (the law as positive law) and the organised action (legal institution) more adequately. It is possible to agree with V.P.Malakhov who notices, that «only on the one hand the sense of justice is the form of knowledge of world around. On the other hand, it acts as way of that comprehension as we learn the validity». [657] Thereupon it is necessary to understand as archetypes of sense of justice intersubektivno recognised values of society (or groups) through which prism there is a perception and understanding of the social validity and which influence rationalisation of the purposes of individuals or social groups, and also for ways of their achievement. And from this party, archetypes of sense of justice have aprioristic character: through socialisation mechanisms (in a broad sense this word) they are brought in individual and group consciousness.

In what basic difference of legal values from other ways of public regulation, for example, morals or tradition (custom)? Traditions were generated at a dawn of human history and were then unique way of social regulation. As a matter of fact, it is the syncretic form doratsionalisticheskoj society self-reflexions. As a result of rationalisation processes initially uniform tradition (custom) has started to be differentiated on various forms of public consciousness: religion, morals, the right and a science.

In turn moral standards and values regulate individual behaviour. Under the form is samoobjazyvanie persons. Other person (social group) can condemn or exclude only from the circle of contacts not moral (or immoral), in its opinion, the person. Thus it is necessary to notice, that the maintenance of moral standards has universal and abstract character. As fairly in due time has noted I.Kant, in morals the person is subordinated «only own and, nevertheless, to the general legislation». [658] Generality of the maintenance of a moral standard pulls together it with norm legal. However values of sense of justice co-ordinate public interaction (cooperation or the conflict) unlike moral imperatives which are directed on individual behaviour in various situations.

Archetypes of sense of justice are values (or norms) a social order (solidarizatsii societies), ways of management and power realisation. Social interaction generates claims on predicted behaviour of other actors and accordingly expectation of following to archetypes of sense of justice. Therefore it is possible to agree with L.I.

Petrazhitsky which connected specificity of the right from it atributivnodistributivnoj the nature. [659] about same V.P.Malakhov writes: «Claim should be considered as the fundamental certificate defining the nature of the right and sense of justice, that is as actually legal phenomenon. Consecutive expansion of the maintenance of claim represents process obektivatsii maintenances of sense of justice in a legal reality, and reflexion of this process constitutes an essence of the description of a legal reflexion. Individual and public legal space as the unique reality legal beings, represents multilevel structure of claims». [660]

Pritjazatelnost archetypes of sense of justice closely connects them normativnost with emotional level of individual and group consciousness (mentality) and by that gives them special force and effectiveness. Moral imperative default starts mechanisms of experience of discrepancy to a certain ideal of due behaviour (conscience). Kognitivnyj the discord at discrepancy to archetypes of sense of justice of expected behaviour of other social subjects has the consequence or anger (struggle for the right), or frustratsiju (legal nihilism). The paradigm with reference to sense of justice and its archetypes is the concept expressing its theoretical (rational) level. Change of a dominating paradigm in this or that sphere of knowledge always means radical lomku teoretiko-methodological bases of scientific search and marks itself a new mark in the course of knowledge of the corresponding phenomena.

In a context of experience of ideological crisis of domestic constitutionalism in the conditions of action of Organic laws of 1906 it is interesting to consider a situation in modern Russia after acceptance in

1993 of the Constitution which at first sight corresponds to the most rigid criteria of liberal views and democratic character. However, according to V.V. Lapaevoj, «specificity of the present historical moment consists that the official legal doctrine which has received fastening in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, it has appeared gumanistichnee still dominating in the Russian jurisprudence (both in the theory, and in practice) legistskogo pravoponimanija, got to it in the inheritance from the Soviet period». [661] we Will remind, that according to classical Soviet definition, the right is «set of rules of the behaviour expressing will of a ruling class, established by legislative action, and also customs and the rules of a hostel authorised by the government which application is provided with compulsory force of the state with a view of protection, fastenings and developments of public relations and the usages favourable and ugodnyh

To ruling class ». [662 [663]

Application by the Russian elite of the valuable models bearing a print Soviet legizma is represented, that, at loan of ideas of constitutionalism and its public institutes in the course of working out of the Constitution of 1993 seriously, in our opinion, deforms aksiologicheskoe the maintenance of the given paradigm. It also results, under the art remark of academician O.E.Kutafina, in a situation when we have in our country so-called «imaginary constitutionalism» instead of freedom and democracy, on fidelity which the Russian power and jurists swear. The reason of it, according to V.V. Lapaevoj, consists that «the dogma of the Russian right which is the main link between the legal theory and practice, still remains legistskoj (that is based on a right and law identification as any establishment of the power) and, hence, does not comprise criteria of difference of the right from an arbitrariness». [664] That it to prove (1) it is necessary eksplitsirovat internal antinomichnost treatments of concept of freedom in modern domestic jurisprudence and (2) to show, how it is possible to overcome it on the basis of author's interpretation of a phenomenon of the constitutionalism, offered in §1 Chapters I.

At first sight, as though our suspicions are groundless. As the Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation V.D.Zorkin writes: « In a sense the Constitution of 1993 is expression of the basic legal values, such as the rights and freedom of the person; the supremance of law, justice and equality; the democratic, federal, legal and social state; separation of powers; parliamentarism; legal economy ». [665] These values, in its opinion, form certain hierarchy, at which higher constitutional value the norm about the rights and freedom of the person is. It is a question in this case of item 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation according to which« the person, its rights and freedom are the higher value », about ch. 2 items 17 where it is established, that« fundamental laws and freedom of the person are inaliennable and belong to everyone from a birth », about ch. 2 items 18, fixing position that these rights and freedom« are directly operating »and others. However as the Constitution of the Russian Federation represents the normative act concerning a positive law, it is not deprived the defined

Lacks, including nestykovok its separate positions with postulates of the is natural-legal doctrine laying in its basis (G lavas I and II). The interpretation offered by us leaning against the Constitutions listed above article and archetypes of the constitutional sense of justice, allows to overcome similar defects of the text of our Organic law as gives the chance, «not being limited to positive norms of the Constitution, to be guided also obshchepravovymi by principles and the positions corresponding to is natural-legal character born and inalienable rights and freedom of the person». [666]

What is the rights and freedom of the person from the point of view of modern Russian jurisprudence? First of all, it is a way of legal restriction of the power. In other words, restriction of the state intrusion into sphere of a private and public autonomy of the person is carried out by means of inalienable laws recognised for everyone person and freedom which cannot be broken or any way limited. As known Russian constitutionalist B.S.Ebzeev writes thereupon: « Thanking these rights - economic, social and cultural, and also civil and political - the government not only is limited on spheres of the display and ways of influence, but also becomes subordinate legislation. Presence at the individual of the guaranteed rights and freedom transforms it in «the partner equal in rights» the states, capable to show to the last the legal claims which validity establishes court and by that promotes the legality statement in state activity ». [667] From such understanding it is clearly visible, for what human rights as a legal design as a certain means, but is unevident are necessary in what their value. In other words, at such interpretation

Remains not clear for what to the person to become equal to the state. Can because the power and the state are a certain fundamental threat to desire of the person to be free? And why the legal way for achievement of this purpose is required? And in general: as far as possible equality of the person and the state?

The answer to these questions can be such: human rights eksplitsirujut idea of the right as that and idea of freedom as that. The chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation V.D.Zorkin and underlines: «I Will remind, that words« liberal "," freedom "," the right »designate the one-serial phenomena as it is right there is a norm, freedom measure». [668] laying aside the question on, whether can ravnoporjadkovoe be one the phenomenon a measure for other one-serial phenomenon with it, [669] remains not clear as such understanding of a parity of "freedom" and "right" can be concretised, especially, if to take into consideration other major legal postulate which in a statement of the same author says: «the right Essence - the compromise of interests at each given stage, [a] the Constitution is its higher legal expression». [670]

Here again on a gain to domestic jurisprudence the dogmatic method comes: «In the state life, at power realisation there should not be nothing superlegal, nadpravovogo. On this basis connection of force with the right (the power of the right and the power right) is carried out. The power is so legitimate, how much she leans against the right. On the essence it is right expression in its action». [671] it turns out, that any power basically is legitimate, because it is legal on the essence. And the compromise of interests thereupon is not that other as intersubektivnaja community of interests of dominating elite, instead of unity of interests of citizens and the state as all know, that separate citizens are not subjects of a policy in our country though possess, according to the Constitution of 1993, extensive human rights and the citizen.

And what such right thereupon? The right as a matter of fact is identity of some one-serial phenomena. V.D.Zorkin makes following definition: «the Right as norm of freedom by the nature is justice, or legal equality». [672 [673] Right, certainly, does not exist in the nature as that. It finds the expression in the law, more precisely speaking, is made out in the law. As the academician Nersesjants V. S marked thereupon: « Value of the law (positive law) and the state... Consists in their legal effect and sense. The right purposes as due concerning the law (positive law) and the state should be legal. The legal law and a lawful state is, hence, absolutely legal purposes-values and constant obligation - the requirement for the real law (positive law) and the state ». But thus, as the Chairman of the Constitutional court of the Russian Federation fairly marks, the supremance of law is not identical to leadership of the law as at power abusings in the law form can clothe and an arbitrariness though remains not clear as it in general is possible at legal that of essence of the power. G ranitsej accurately separating the law as the right from the law as power abusings is a measure of observance of the rights and freedom of the person. But also here it is necessary to be careful. After all as the norm of freedom does not mean the right, that freedom of the individual is absolute.

The basic borders of the rights and freedom of the person, it agree ч.3 item 17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the rights and freedom of other citizens are. More precisely speaking, «... By means of rules of law freedom of the individual is delimited from freedom of others». [674] For this reason, probably, according to ч.3 item 55

Constitutions of the Russian Federation, the right and freedom of the person can be limited by the federal act only in that measure in what it is necessary with a view of protection of bases of the constitutional system, morals, health, the rights and legitimate interests of other persons, maintenance of defence of the country and safety of the state. We will stop on this question of principle more in detail.

Thus, as considers V.D.Zorkin, the right imperative about the person as assumes the purposes, that the political expediency should soobrazovyvatsja with the right, that as we remember, and is essence of the power as that. He even writes thereupon: «Democracy and a lawful state should be protected from not legal (antilegal) and not democratic (antidemocratic) actions by exclusively legal and democratic methods». [675] In other words, the right is incompatible with an arbitrariness even if it is given the shape the law. When periodically before our eyes there is an arbitrariness under the law it is not necessary to trust the eyes and to search for the deep reasons. After all it only accident as it is not legal law, and it contradicts the right

(To freedom, justice, equality), so also legal essence of the power. In general, as they say, only the court can judge, that is that though as all know, the court is one of three branches of the power who, in turn, can not only apply the right and the law, but also to create an arbitrariness.

Known Russian jurist B.S.Ebzeev explains: «the Constitution does not give the bases to bypass the law referring to the right as it would lead to washing out of the constitutional functions and would deprive the Organic law of the rationalising and stabilising action provided by the Constitution».1 It is a conclusion concerns also all system of the federal legislation. And for what are required then such refined differentiations of the right and the law even if justice, agrees ч.1 item 120 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, it should be managed not on the basis of the right (freedom, justice, equality), and proceeding from texts of the Core and other federal acts.

What for then the modern Russian state-legal doctrine cultivates ideologemu «natural deaths of the person» and even fixes it in Constitution item 2? Most likely to prove "legal" essence of the Russian State for as we remember, it agree legistskim to values, any power as that is by the nature legal, and, hence, with Constitution acceptance per 1993 in Russia there was a lawful state. The chairman of the Constitutional court of the Russian Federation V.D.Zorkin about historical conditions of acceptance of the Organic law writes the following: « The people which dissatisfied with absence of any political freedom and do not have experience of connection of the right and freedom, the first steps on freedom way have accepted as the invitation to permissiveness. Always an indistinct side in Russian culture between freedom and anarchy... Has bared the main risk - risk of loss of the state and historical life together with it. [676 [677] [678] outstanding value of acceptance of the Constitution of 1993 consisted that it has fixed durability of the state designs and has simultaneously kept space for freedom in these strong designs ». And for not able and not understanding citizens as it is necessary to connect the right and freedom there is an old checked up means - authoritarianism which in treatment of the Russian legal reason not only is admissible, but also even is natural. As writes thereupon V.D.Zorkin:« authoritarianism as an element of practice of realisation of the political power is caused by features

- 3

Transition period from not legal past to new democracy ».

On the basis of the above-stated it is obviously possible to formulate some basic limitations (archetypes) of the modern Russian state-legal doctrine which find the expression in antinomichnosti treatments of a category "freedom".

The first limitation can be defined as the antinomy of the Russian sociality. On the one hand, freedom of the person in general is necessary the higher constitutional value which should define law-making and pravoprimenenie in our state. From other party, century inability of real Russian citizens reasonably and responsibly is postulated to use freedom, that is as a matter of fact, from a point legal sight, they cannot lead a legal life without care from the authorities. This sight is promoted by the thesis

About an incommensurability of paradigms or legal cultures. So, for example, V.P.Malakhov in this occasion writes the following: «Sistemoobrazujushchimi ideas of the Russian legal culture are ideas of the truth, favour, service and torture. They - the semantic knots directly caused by domination in the Russian spirituality of the religious and moral moments. Sistemoobrazujushchimi ideas

The West European legal culture ideas of freedom, the law, a civil society and natural deaths of the person are. They - the semantic knots directly caused by domination in the West European spirituality of the political and rationalistic moments. At level sistemoobrazujushchih ideas and the logician interference and comparability of cultures it is minimum and it is not connected with change of qualitative characteristics ». [679 [680] it turns out, that in casus Rossica freedom realisation is impossible basically. Also the reception of other constitutional values and public institutes is impossible, and the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 is only the declaration on intentions, not clearly, the truth, for whom, instead of the document of direct action. Obviously, what exactly therefore at us is accepted so many laws in which the proclaimed rights and свободы.2 are specified, become simpler and limited

The second limitation is shown in the antinomy of equality of the person and the state. According to dogmas of the domestic legal doctrine maintenance of a primacy of freedom of the person as higher value is possible through legal restriction of the government. Thereby the power is allocated with life independent of citizens. It becomes equal, so also equivalent to the individual, instead of derivative from constituent

(Contractual) freedom of the person and the citizen, a phenomenon. Though, certainly, in a reality it is impossible. Even according to legal canons and practice of the state building, legal relation of the equal parties are regulated by an optional method on the basis of the free

Wills (contract), and relation of unequal subjects - an imperative method. And after all last method also is an essence of administrative law which regulates sphere of a public autonomy of the person. [681] it is obvious, that equality of the person and the state is fiction of the Russian state-legal doctrine and as a matter of fact it reduces freedom of the individual to a private autonomy as equivalent subjects, proceeding from a principle of equality of the parties, cannot interfere with affairs each other. But if this fiction to consider in interrelation with the antinomy of the Russian sociality also the volume diskretsii the individual within a private autonomy will depend completely on the discretion of the authorities.

The third limitation of the Russian state-legal doctrine is expressed in the identification antinomy. As we have shown, for it the right, freedom, etc. are the phenomena of one order and the maintenance of these concepts, in effect, coincides. It is represented, that the identification of the right, freedom, equality and justice, only aggravates fiction of legal restriction of the power in concrete Russian conditions and allows to reduce freedom to equality, and justice - to the right issued in the law. Such simple logic design allows to change freedom understood in a broad sense as private and a public autonomy of the social subject, the list of its some rights and separate freedom which besides can be limited any way to the state as the legal institution by the nature, towering over the identified phenomena. And if still to consider and the antinomy of the Russian sociality it will turn out, that any equal restrictions of freedom of potentially incapacitated citizens who are not inclined owing to special historical conditions of Russia to rational (obedient) behaviour from the state will be legal.

Thus, it is obvious, that legistskie archetypes of the Russian state-legal doctrine do not allow to realise declared by the Constitution of the Russian Federation a principle of a priority of the rights and freedom of the person in lawmaking and pravoprimenenii. It is represented, that to fill with the constitutional maintenance our "sovereign" democracy constitutionalism reconsideration, eksplitsirovanie its base values and ideas, and also their consequences is necessary. Now we will show how probably to overcome the given antinomy, on the basis of offered by us in §1 Chapters of I interpretation of a phenomenon of constitutionalism.

The antinomy of the Russian sociality acts in film as irrelevantnaja to a problem of construction of a free society in the constitutional sense. References to century inability of the Russian citizens to life in freedom mean not that other as attributing by it mass legal nedeespobnosti and prove as a matter of fact necessity of strong state compulsion in spite of the fact that there is a constitutional priority of the rights and freedom of citizens. And it as we have shown, narrows freedom space as that at the expense of sphere expansion diskretsii the government. From the point of view of understanding of a phenomenon of constitutionalism offered by us ostensibly mass inability of the Russian citizens to life in freedom within the limits of the Russian laws testifies to absence of freedom in general, and also about injustice of existing system of the power which discriminates sphere of a private and public autonomy. As any power is only monopolisation of function of management so far as wines of our fellow citizens only that they do not struggle for restriction of this monopoly, and live in a captivity of illusion of an equivalence of the government and the person. [682]

This situation is promoted also by the second limitation of the Russian state-legal doctrine which we have described as the antinomy of equality of the citizen and the state. The essence of this antinomy from the point of view of constitutionalism consists giving of the government independent (and, hence, equivalent) from citizens of life through ostensibly its legal restriction. Equality of the power and the citizen as a beautiful legal principle actually belittles freedom of such social subject as the people. As is known, the people - this certain set of citizens rallied in certain territory intersubektivno by recognised values of sense of justice (in case of the constitutional sense of justice - norms of freedom and justice), possess the advantage which obektiviruetsja and is theoretically comprehended as the sovereignty. Hence, the government becomes subordinate legislation (legal) not because it is equal to the separate citizen, that is why it proizvodna from the constituent power of set of citizens, from the people sovereignty. Theoretical position about a contractual (constituent) origin of the constitutional state deprives of independent value such concept as «the state interest» which becomes justified only in case of equivalence of the citizen and the power. [683]

The third archetype of the Russian state-legal doctrine, which essence consists in an identification of the right, freedom and justice with equality, is basic dogma of domestic legal science. [684] it is obvious, that any identification creates possibility of substitution of one phenomenon other essence which though is an identity element, nevertheless, remains other phenomenon with own ontologiej and gnoseology. Because of it Russian the state-legal doctrine loses clear criteria of differentiation of the right, freedom, justice and equality. Moreover, this identification is possible to the point of irrationality when the state becomes the legal phenomenon by the nature, and equality in restriction of freedom of citizens - quintessence of the Russian right. Thereby any criticism of the existing will of the power issued in the law becomes obviously unfair and not legal. And the most important thing - such identification undermines a justice basis, that is procedures of correlation of the normative act or act with norms of freedom and justice. Also at such aksiologii the law has a presumption of expression of rules of law on the ground that in it the command of the power which have undergone certain procedure of the edition even if it thus tramples on freedom is issued. It is represented, what exactly therefore in our country claims against an arbitrariness of public authorities practically are not satisfied also to our citizens it is necessary to hope only for fair decisions of international courts over which the antinomy considered by us do not prevail.

Under the influence of Soviet legizma the category of "justice" which in modern constitutionalism is closely interconnected with the concept of the social state has undergone to similar valuable distortions. [685] we will consider arguments of some modern domestic jurists about basic impossibility of coexistence of freedom and social justice in the state in their kind internal kontradiktornosti. Our position consists that real constitutional problems of the social state [686] are an internal source of development of the given concept, and does not testify at all to its inconsistency. We will try to show, that the decision of these problems probably on a way of development of constitutionalism as defined aksiologicheskoj paradigms.

In the domestic legal doctrine to the basic signs of the social state carry, as a rule, maintenance of a worthy life and creation of conditions for free development of the person. The most typical for the Russian legal discourse can be found definition of the given phenomenon at N.A.Baievoj. She considers, that «the state can be defined as social only when a problem of reproduction of human life as biological beings, as potential subject of all kinds of public ability to live

Becomes the main task of institutes of the government when it is created and the legal system of protection of social interests of the person, when on the decision of social problems sorientirovany economy, a policy and a spiritual life of a society »operates. [687] In our opinion, such understanding of essence of the social state does not add anything actually scientific to item 7 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation which says:« the Russian Federation - the social state, which politician is directed on creation of conditions providing a worthy life and free development of the person ». It is obvious, that pseudoscientific repetition of the constitutional norm does not open it aksiologicheskoe the maintenance. Besides, if to adhere to the point of view set forth above there is nothing to object the Russian jurist of h.p. Mamutu who in known article« from the point of view of the right »has put forward the Social state some serious arguments against this concept. [688 [689]

First, h.p. Mamut considers erroneous an identification of the state with its device as «the aggregated and arranged society which has reached in economic and sotsiokulturnom the development of a stage of a civilisation is meant the state» in the publicly-imperious way. Or in other words, the state is not that other, as the publicly-imperious organisation of the people arising at a known stage of its history. Therefore it is impossible to speak about social requirements to the state (its device) as its device disposes only of those riches which are created by all members of a society. Accordingly, from this point of view there are immoral claims of separate members of the society which are not participating in joint cooperation, for any part of public riches. These requirements are immoral doubly for they aspire to lean against compulsory force of machinery of state.

Secondly, according to h.p. Mamuta, not all is safe in the concept of the social state and from the point of view of the right. After all the right represents itself as a regulator of the public relations constructed on the basis of reciprocity and equivalence. As this scientist writes: «the Reciprocity constitutes secret spirit of the right, but in the right it already gets the equivalence form. Legal the given claims become (turn to competences) because those are in nerazedinimoj to a sheaf with korrespondirujushchimi it duties». [690] Proceeding from such understanding of the right, the conclusion follows only one: « Process of interaction within the limits of social activity of the modern state does not occur. Lines of mutuality, reciprocity are not inherent in it. Such ascertaining has enough for that recognition, that it proceeds out of sphere of the right, a bearing which design I is, will repeat, just an equivalence principle ». [691] As the blessings which are received by some citizens of the social state, arrive to them on a gratuitous basis so far as so-called social rights not only are immoral for apply for another's blessings, but carry also antilegal character.

Thirdly, h.p. Mamut objects to linkage of a source of social rights with a category «human advantage», that, for example, allowed by authors «the International pact about economic,

The social and cultural rights »(1966). [692 [693] [694] This jurist reasonably objects, that there is no conventional understanding of the given category in domestic jurisprudence (as though there is such clearness with other legal categories). Therefore it is impossible to reflect efficiently on those« the rights which arise from this not clear substance, about their basis and the maintenance ». Each person in any state possesses the certain rights and duties, but not that any congenital advantage that is why, that it is included in a certain network of social interactions is inherent in it. Therefore the economic, social and cultural rights are based not on the right (in understanding of h.p. Mamuta), and on the law.« G osudarstvom (through its bodies of public authority) they officially are proclaimed and admit, legalizirujutsja. But duties, korrespondirujushchih to these rights-claims, are not present ». At first sight, such"public"interpretation of the human

Advantages through an inclusiveness of the individual in system of social interrelations bears a strong resemblance to theses of such theoretical opponent of idea of independent value of the right, as K.Marx. [695] but our dear political scientist does not see any contradiction in the intentsii to prove not legal character of the social state, and also to belittle value of a category of human advantage for jurisprudence.

On the same purposes last is directed also - the fourth - argument of h.p. Mamuta - the thesis about basic injustice social

The states. «If as justice to understand a formal equality of free people, conformity (harmony) of their competences and duties, equivalence given by them to a society and received from it (such understanding of justice is comprehensible only) in social activity of the state it, of course, is not realised». [696] And further h.p. Mamut underlines: «the right World« is not equipped »under accession in it« social justice »(actual equality). It is under construction as set of horizontal symmetric relations between participants of universal process of social interaction». [697 [698]

H.p. Mamut urges not to confuse thereupon a moral imperative to help requiring fellow citizens and legal obligation. Justice is a formal equality, and social vulnerability of some categories of citizens does not assign on gosudarstvennoorganizovannoe a society the legal obligation to provide to everyone «a worthy life». Thereupon it is not becomes clear, as it is possible proceeding from Marxist understanding of public essence of the person, not to do the following step and not to recognise as unfair such is formal-equal social interactions in which result there are weights of requiring citizens. It is possible only in one case if to consider after F.A.Hayek, that «or unfair the situations created after an ox of the person can be fair only, and particulars of a spontaneous order cannot be fair or unfair». And as following step - to recognise human inferiority

(nedostojnost) these categories of socially deprived citizens.

Such antihumane criticism of the concept of the social state, denying achievements of the Russian constitutionalism by the second

Half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings in person P.I.Novgorodtseva, B.A.Kistjakovsky, I.A.Pokrovsk and others, became possible in the theory (and it is partly realised in practice by the Russian government) because in the domestic legal and philosophical literature practically there are no works in which eksplitsirovalas aksiologicheskaja interrelation of the given concept with the theory and constitutionalism practice. We will consider how probably to answer the above described reproaches to the social state from the point of view of base archetypes

The constitutional sense of justice.

The constitutionalism has appeared as a new paradigm in the conditions of formation of a bourgeois society. As that in the scientific literature it is understood victoriously extended in XVIII - XIX century a public order characterised by four basic signs. First - the right of free self-determination of the individual in those spheres of a public life which are not integrated

Directly in official state structures - first of all in economy and culture. Institutsionalnoj the private property was a basis of this right. Secondly - self-control of freely proceeding process of economic and cultural development proceeding from a principle of freedom of the contract at the order the private property. Thirdly - achievement of the maximum economic and cultural productivity in the course of free competition on the basis of freedom and individual responsibility principle. And, in - the fourth, - formation of new public elite - the bourgeoisie superseding from the state posts former exclusive estates, first of all ground nobility. Now human advantage was deduced from property qualifications, instead of from aristocratic merits. Formation of such society was, inherently, a grandiose social revolution, irrespective of the form of its course.

At a stage of formation of a bourgeois society the theory of the constitutional (legal) state became its first program based on principles of constitutionalism. Under «the constitutional

(Legal) state »in the given paradigm the state, creation having by the purpose institutsionalnyh preconditions for a recognition of equal human advantage for each citizen through maintenance of realisation of its right to a private and public autonomy is understood. Certain principles have been developed for the decision of this problem. First, it is a principle of separation of powers, that is the divided existence legislative, executive and the judicial authority. Secondly, a principle of independence of court according to which both legal proceedings process, and the decision made by court should be completely independent as from influence of higher instances, and any influence from the outside. Thirdly, it is a principle podzakonnosti administration managerial control which excludes possibility of realisation of such administrative activity which is not based on norms of the existing legislation, and the most important thing it should not contradict base values of constitutionalism. In other words, administrative activity cannot limit freedom and belittle human advantage except for extreme public situations (war, state of emergency in connection with any natural cataclysms, etc.). Fourthly, it is a principle of judicial protection which guarantees possibility of a prize of the legal action against any illegal administrative action. Fifthly, it is a principle of legal responsibility

The state bodies, providing the right to property indemnification the victim owing to both lawful, and illegal administrative activity. It is obvious, that these principles are internally interconnected and cannot function separately from each other.

However it is impossible, as it did and many Russian lawyers do, to reduce all maintenance of concept a lawful state to the principles set forth above. It only signs of formal legality with which as the theory and practice of imaginary constitutionalism in many countries have shown, autocrats and bureaucrats of all colours can operate and pervert only perfectly. «The true sense, a true essence of a lawful state is a real, material justice. The state is truly legal only in the event that it - both in the structures, and in the activity - is directed on justice maintenance». [699]

It is possible to tell with confidence, that the idea of social justice is konstituirujushchej in process solidarizatsii societies throughout all human history. Representation about the public relation as fair, intersubektivno recognised, provides legitimation of political institutes and leaders. In other words, the idea of social justice carries out valuable integration of all members of a society. Therefore the above-stated five principles of formal legality are only means for service of idea of real justice in which practical realisation the idea of the constitutional (legal) state as that is justified.

Certainly, in each type of a society there is a understanding of idea of social justice. [700] thereupon social justice enters as the concrete historical form of the social compromise reached on rational (diskursivnoj) to a basis, as konkretnoistoricheskaja legal and a moral standard of a recognition of human advantage. Just as the science opens various forms of true, instead of true as a certain Absolute, constitutionalism in concrete historical circumstances rationally (diskursivno) develops the social justice form. Speaking to philosophical language, social justice an essence attribute, instead of a substance, it is valuable measurement of legitimation of the power and a social order. From the point of view of constitutionalism, socially fair is such public condition (law position, functioning of political institute) which does not limit, and expands is better, space of freedom of the individual, sphere of its private and public autonomy. It is necessary to notice also, that in history of constitutionalism social justice acted as rationally (diskursivno) the proved form of a recognition of human advantage.

Industrialisation in XIX century has led to a situation when representation about the justice, theoretically comprehended in the theory of a lawful state which has consolidated in due time the third estate and has led it on storm of traditional and monarchic institutes of the Old regime, could not be realised any more. Creation of large factories and factories is required concentration in cities of the individuals selling the unique property - the ability to work, that is a labour and everything receiving in exchange, that is necessary for a life - habitation, I peep etc. Deprived of traditional social protection from a local community (neighbour's solidarity) and not having a private property, these individuals in the opinion of bourgeoisie also have been deprived also human advantage. And for this reason they could be subjected operation. Pauperisation so brightly described by K.Marx, has caused class struggle for the statement of human advantage of people of wage labour for the sake of justice. And it is not casual this struggle it was led, first of all, for the political rights, and then already for social, economic and other rights, [701] as in constitutionalism a private and public autonomy are closely interconnected.

As citizens as proprietors became has been forced to refuse idea of the state as night watchman ever less so far as society, to avoid desolidarizatsii and full self-damage, for the sake of justice and freedom for all citizens and to create its new type which has received in the scientific literature the name of "the social state». Such state should provide reproduction of the citizen as the person with feeling of the advantage capable to a private and public autonomy, from weight of the people dispossessed and living wage labour. And in this point aksiologichesky the constitutionalism disperses from the Russian state-legal doctrine placing emphasis at definition of sense of the social state on biological reproduction of the person.

That there was a possibility of inclusion of the dispossessed citizens in democratic process, within the limits of a constitutionalism paradigm it was required to rethink and pereformulirovat a number of basic "natural deaths" of the person - the right to life and the right to the property, together with the right concept as that.

First of all, it became clear, that for the citizens existing at the expense of sale of the labour, the right to life can be realised only in the form of the right to worthy work. For this reason all actions for a work humanisation began in all countries with activity of factory inspections.

Further it has been established, that the matrix of the individual and free labour contract does not create equality of the parties (the worker and the capitalist) in the contract though on this postulate the then right kept. Such equality can be reached only through a recognition of a reality and the importance of labour collective which gives the chance to the separate worker to be realised as the high-grade subject in relations with the employer. Therefore in all developed countries inevitably there were the trade unions capable on equal to carry on negotiations with businessmen, and also there was a mechanism of the collective employment contract where base conditions on hiring were defined.

The system of obligatory collective insurance [702] from risks of wage labour (sudden disability, an old age, unemployment, etc.) became top of process of revision of the basic doctrines of a "classical" (liberal) legal discourse. [703] Now in system of obligatory social insurance the individual risk became covered because it has been included in system of collective protection. But the most important thing consisted that this system allowed to overcome a dichotomy an autonomy of the proprietor/geteronomija of the hired worker. «The decision social [the worker - Century of Century K] a question consisted not in cancelling opposition the proprietor / nesobstvennik, and to redefine it, that is to contrast with a private property other type of the property, namely public, allowing to receive protection, not having a private property. [Now - Century of Century K] Source of social safety became some kind of transfer of the property by means of work and under the state control ». [704] Occurrence of the property of the public funds operated the state, has created a new historical situation when payments in the general funds were obligatory and thus gave the inalienable right which could not be deduced on the market. The salary has ceased to be only compensation to the worker, an equivalent of cost of its labour. Henceforth it comprised a part representing the original labour rent for vneproizvodstvennyh of situations. Thereby insurance entered the hired worker in a legal order.

Defined preferentsii thereupon has received also the state. Now, operating a public property, it has ceased to be only the defender of the bourgeois property and, hence, it has started to lean against a wide social base. At it necessity to struggle with the program of socialist assignment of all property disappears. It is possible to tell with confidence, that, providing through insurance and public property institutes to socially weak citizens a living wage which is necessary for preservation of their human advantage, the social state accepts thereby responsibility for maintenance of the preconditions necessary for functioning of a civil freedom fixed in the constitution.

Thus, from the point of view aksiologicheskogo constitutionalism, the social state can be defined as such state which guarantees in the publicly-imperious image to each citizen certain standards of material conditions the abilities to live allowing it to realise the right to a private and public autonomy. [705] from the political point of view the social state can be considered also as institutsionalizirovannyj the class compromise, having the legitimirujushchej a basis active creation by the power of possibilities for satisfaction growing material and spiritual needs of individuals in the conditions of democracy.

Now we in a condition to resolve the constitutional problems of the social state which have been noted h.p. Mamutom, leaning on aksiologicheskuju the importance of the given institute in a constitutionalism paradigm.

The first problem which is expressed in immorality of requirements of a recognition of the social rights addressed to machinery of state as the state is the aggregated society, dares in constitutionalism as follows. The constitutional (legal) state has not natural, but a contractual origin. Proceeding from a recognition of equal human advantage for each citizen, and in case of the people as a whole speak about its sovereignty, the constitutional state an essence set of the certain institutes, called to realise the constitutional values, that is to fill with the real maintenance of concept of freedom and justice. Therefore any requirements of maintenance of human advantage should be turned to the state bodies, and the aspiration to belittle such right is immoral.

The second problem - the contradiction between requirements of a lawful state and the purposes of the state social though h.p. Mamut prefers to speak about not legal essence of the social state. An essence of the first ostensibly is korrespondirovanie the rights and duties on the basis of a principle of equivalence of an exchange. [706] in case of social security, in its opinion, it is necessary to speak about privileges, instead of about the rights. From the point of view aksiologicheskogo constitutionalism it not that other, as an unreasonable reduction of the abstract legal form to formulas of the simple commodity production, reflected still the Roman private law, that is data of all completeness of human freedom to one - market - the form of a private autonomy where the optional method actually is often applicable. In a case of the state building, which is regulated by branch administrative (or tax) with its imperative method, it is inconvenient to speak the rights about equivalence of an exchange. In constitutionalism as to the theoretical form of sense of justice to state duties to condition for realisation of a private and public autonomy on the basis of a recognition of equal human advantage the rights of citizens to demand execution of these obligations resist. In sphere of material ability to live these rights are called as social and economic, and in political - human rights and the citizen.

The third remark to the social state is connected with negation of the importance of a category «human advantage» as there is no its conventional treatment. In our opinion, such treatment can appear as a result of offered by us aksiologicheskoj constitutionalism interpretations. And from this point of view, human advantage can be understood as ability of each individual according to the age to realisation of a private and public autonomy, that is to rational free behaviour. In the right a category equivalent human advantage is a category of the legal personality of the person which is defined, how ability of the person to get the right, to carry out duties and to bear responsibility for unfair realisation of the rights or discharge of duties. Thereupon rationality of human advantage can be defined as conscientiousness of free behaviour, that is as observance of a principle of good will at realisation of a private and public autonomy. As according to the known logic theorem of K.Gedelja's incompleteness any formal system can prove from itself the initial parcels, [707] so far as the category of human advantage serves as the valuable base of the modern right and the state and does not come under to a substantiation a legallistic method.

And last, but not on value, a problem of the social state, according to h.p. Mamuta, consists that it initially declares the unreal purposes, namely, achievement of material justice. An essence of last, in its opinion, is uravnilovka. Legal justice is possible only as a formal equality of subjects, as is essence of the right as that. From the point of view of constitutionalism, justice is not a certain condition, and process of creation of conditions for realisation by the social subject of the private and public autonomy. And formal justice - necessary, but the insufficient precondition of this process. In the conditions of disproportions at distribution of the property, characteristic for a modern society, the formal equality for persons of wage labour can be provided only in the form of realisation of the social and economic rights.

The conflict of the social state to justice in practice begins only when it in the activity departs from insurance of social risks on the basis of a public property and starts to guarantee to the individual that standard of life which it has reached once. « Such guarantee is, in effect, the privilege for it cannot be given to everything so, chances of the bypassed decrease at the expense of exclusive ». [708] transition from initial principles of the social state when it insured freedom of the citizen, to attempt to compensate any costs of a free life and has caused crisis of the modern state of general prosperity in the developed countries. However full dismantle of institutes of the social state will lead only to narrowing of space for a private and public autonomy of overwhelming majority of citizens. Therefore the given institutes it is necessary to develop and fill with the new maintenance, proceeding from offered aksiologicheskoj interpretations of constitutionalism which only and allows to combine freedom and justice consistently.

Thus, the modern Russian constitutionalism and state law, also as well as their predecessors of second half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings, have got to a trap of ostensibility (imitation) implementatsii in a fabric of social being of the constitutional values in the conditions of the reception of public institutes. More precisely speaking, in both cases the reception was reduced to use of the constitutional institutes under the form at ignoring aksiologicheskogo measurements of the given paradigm. Actually this theory has the purpose creation in a society and the state valuable (especially in a picture of the world of elite and intelligency) and institutsionalnyh preconditions for maintenance free, so also worthy human life, for its private and public autonomy. Thereupon the criticism of modern Russian constitutionalism from the point of view aksiologicheskoj not only promotes interpretation of constitutionalism implementatsii this picture of the world in domestic public consciousness, but also directly influences realisation of imperatives of our Constitution in a real life.

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A source: KOCHETKOV VLADIMIR VALEREVICH. IDEAS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN DOMESTIC POLITIKO-LEGAL THOUGHT OF SECOND HALF XIX - The XX-th century BEGINNINGS. The dissertation on competition of a scientific degree of the doctor of juridical science. Moscow 0000. 0000

More on topic § 4. Value of domestic constitutionalism of second half XIX - the beginnings of the XX-th century for modern Russian statehood:

  1. § 3. A problem of "imaginary constitutionalism» and feature of domestic politiko-legal thought of second half XIX - The XX-th century beginnings
  2. KOCHETKOV VLADIMIR VALEREVICH. IDEAS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN DOMESTIC POLITIKO-LEGAL THOUGHT OF SECOND HALF XIX - The XX-th century BEGINNINGS. The dissertation on competition of a scientific degree of the doctor of juridical science. Moscow 0000, 0000
  3. § 2. A problem of a parity constitutional and a lawful state in domestic politiko-legal thought of second half XIX - The XX-th century beginnings
  4. § 1. Problems of the theory of the constitutional state in domestic politiko-legal thought of second half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings
  6. § 2. The constitutional problems of parliamentary democracy and the state system form in domestic politiko-legal thought of second half XIX - the beginnings of the XX-th century [306]
  7. the Chapter II. Guarding ideology of first half XIX century about values of Russian statehood
  8. the Chapter III. The ethical concept of Russian statehood in second half XIX – the beginning of XX century
  10. the Appendix 7. The comparative table of textbooks on general and domestic history of the Russian classical grammar schools of second half XIX - the beginnings of XX centuries
  11. factors of formation and development of conceptual bases soyoderzhanija gymnasia formation in Russia of second half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings
  12. development of methodology of the right and istoriko-theoretical crisis of second half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings: the right encyclopaedia, legal philosophy and the general theory of law
  14. § 1. Development of methodology of the right and istoriko-theoretical crisis of jurisprudence of second half XIX - the XX-th century beginnings: the right encyclopaedia, legal philosophy and the general theory of law
  15. § 1.3. Change of an order of acquisition by police shots in second half XVTTT century - first half XIX century
  17. Chapter 2. Genesis of the housing law of the USA during the period since second half XIX century to second half of XX-th century.
  18. Chapter 1. Value of humanitarian subject matters in the maintenance of domestic classical gymnasia formation for formation of historical consciousness of pupils of second half XIX - the beginnings of XX centuries
  19. § 2. Term application «destructive religious association» to the Russian legislation of second half XIX - the beginnings of XX centuries