<<
>>

§2. Attempts of the "limited" and "full" internationalisation of the Cyprian conflict (1964-67)

Policy Makariosa on Cyprus caused anxiety of all other active participants of the Cyprian situation. Athenes have been so annoyed by independence of the Archbishop and disturbed by danger of opposition with Turkey that "Doctrines of the national centre" where Greeks-Cypriotes would be obliged not to undertake without approval of Athenes any serious шагов.161 Ankara began to insist on registration has been adjusted resolutely: power pressure of Greeks-Cypriotes upon a Turkish community gave a real occasion to involvement of the mechanism of maintenance of the status quo provided by agreements 1959 on island at the expense of joint or unilateral actions of the states-guarantors. The USA and the Great Britain excited, on the one hand, danger of the conflict in NATO concerning Cyprus and, with another, independence of the Cyprian president in Movement of Non-alignment and its line on rapprochement with the socialist countries. As have shown 1960-63, the tsjurihsko-London agreements did not give to "external" actors of sufficient levers of fast and effective influence on Makariosa, going in defiance even to opinion of Athenes, and in the West have been interested in formation of new elements which would do a course of a management of Cyprus more predicted. This purpose was answered with the "limited" internationalisation of the Cyprian problem, for example, within the limits of NATO (or tried five-sided or other format) where Makarios, having appeared in isolation, on the sample of signing of Agreements 1959, would be compelled to capitulate. From its part Makarios, the basic threat seeing in danger of Turkish intrusion, intended to resist to it by means of "full" internationalisation of the Cyprian question, that is problem removal in ООН.162 There Movement of Non-alignment, the state of socialist camp and the USSR could balance voices of the countries of NATO at decision-making in SB or United Nations HECTARES. The London conference which has taken place in January - in a five-sided format became February, 1964 the first international forum called for discussion of a situation on Cyprus after events of December 1963 года.163 On it Turks - Cypriotes, referring to safety reasons, have declared necessity of preservation for force of all complex of the tsjurihsko-London agreements at possible increase in Turkish military presence at Cyprus and obligatory geographical division of communities (it would demand moving to 80 thousand persons - 35 thousand Greeks-Cypriotes and 45 thousand Turks-Cypriotes). In created monoethnic areas it was offered to generate separate administrative and police bodies of communities. Greeks-Cypriotes have rejected these offers, having seen in them attempt of section of island. In turn their vision of the compromise consisted in cancellation of agreements 1959 About guarantees both about the union and in the constitutional reforming of the state system of Republic Cyprus in the spirit of amendments Makariosa - by granting to a Turkish community of self-management concerning religion, formation and culture. Besides, they were ready to consider possibility of short-term presence on Cyprus UN observers or the international police forces. Trying to co-ordinate opposite approaches of the parties, the British minister of affairs of colonies of D.Sandis has presented the compromise project of settlement. Its plan provided encouragement of voluntary moving of Greeks - and Turks-Cypriotes from ethnically mixed деревень164 and preservation in force, basically, the tsjurihsko-London mode at strengthening in system of the state bodies of a role of parliament and nadobshchinnogo the beginnings (thus privileges of Turks-Cypriotes and a parity 70:30 in state bodies remained).
It was besides, offered to raise efficiency of judicial system of Cyprus, first of all the Constitutional court, having provided appeal possibility on the constitutional questions to the international court outside of Cyprus. For prevention of intercommunal violence on island there should arrive peace-making forces under the aegis of NATO. London also let know, that the introduction of Cyprus into NATO would remove concern of Greeks-Cypriotes concerning Turkish threat. The plan has got support of all participants of conference, including Athenes, but have been rejected Makariosom as unacceptable. Greeks-Cypriotes, having appeared at negotiations in loneliness, have rejected, nevertheless, idea of joining of Cyprus to NATO as in this case additional levers of influence on a situation on island would be received by Ankara. Considering refusal of London on a long basis to play a role of peacemakers, 165 paramount urgency was got by a question on a format of the international armed presence on Cyprus. On this background in the end of January, 1964 has been presented co-ordinated by London with США166 the project providing a direction on island for a period of 3 months of a 10-thousand contingent of military men of the countries of NATO which would join located on Cyprus under agreements 1959 Greek and Turkish военнослужащие.167Предполагалось, that the political management will be carried out, however, not by NATO, and specially created intergovernmental commission located in London as a part of representatives of all state-participants of a contingent. For this period Greece and Turkey would take on itself obligations to abstain from unilateral intervention on Cyprus, and all interested parties agreed with appointment of the intermediary (the representative of one of the NATO countries, except the USA and the countries-guarantors) for compromise development as a matter of fact intercommunal disagreements. The given plan has been accepted by Ankara on February, 2nd, 1964; Turks-Cypriotes have approved it "basically". Greece also has found the plan comprehensible, having added two moments: (1) participation of the representative of Cyprus in the commission on a political management of a contingent and (2) approval by the Cyprian government of mission peace-making контингента.168 Makarios, despite pressure from Athenes, were rejected by the American-British project, having specified on an ambiguity of the mandate of peace-making forces and danger of substitution by the commission in London of functions of the government of Cyprus. Besides, the president of Cyprus has supported that the international military contingent has been directed on islands under the aegis of SB the United Nations, and in its mandate, besides assistance of normalisation of conditions, the problem on maintenance of territorial integrity of Cyprus has been included. Having faced opposition Makariosa, the USA and the Great Britain have been compelled to involve in this or that form the United Nations in planned operation and to make changes to the project. Its new variant has been presented on February, 13th, 1964 by the assistant to US State Secretary Dzh. Боллом.169 US president L.Dzhonson has addressed to the Archbishop with an appeal to accept these offers reduced, in addition to the previous version, to approval of peace-making operation on Cyprus the UN Security Council, transfer of a post of the chairman The commissions on a political management of a contingent to the representative >> The secretary general of the United Nations and to the obligation of the intermediary on intercommunal settlement to inform the Secretary general of the United Nations on the activity. Makarios in the answer has suggested to generate peace-making forces from military men of the countries of British Commonwealth, Ireland and neutral Sweden, but without participation of Greece and Turkey. Besides, the major, according to the Archbishop, fastening in the mandate of the forces was, which stay on island would be limited to three months (with the prolongation right at the reference of the Cyprian government), problems on assistance to the authorities in legality and order restoration. Makarios also informed on intention to address in SB the United Nations for acceptance of the resolution, calling to respect territorial integrity and political independence of Republic Cyprus. Aspiring to keep the initiative and understanding impossibility of the further imposing of the plan, on February, 15th, 1964 London has made in the United Nations the offer on convocation of session SB for situation consideration on island. The same offer has arrived hardly later from Cyprus. Achieving removal of the Cyprian question in the United Nations, Makarios expected to block initiatives laying in other format on settlement within the limits of the "limited" internationalisation - under its press it has appeared again in London. Besides, Makarios planned to untie to itself hands for reforming of structure of the government, having achieved from the United Nations of ascertaining of frailty of Agreements 1959 and a recognition of the government of Greeks-Cypriotes the government of all Cyprus in spite of the fact that after December, 1963 the turko-Cyprian ministers have left the posts. And, at last, on a plan of the Archbishop, arrival of forces of the United Nations should become constraining Turkey фактором.170 Result of discussion (on February, 18th - on March, 4th, 1964), 171 became key for the further development of relations round Cyprus the resolution 186 SB the United Nations which have confirmed legitimacy of the government of Cyprus. Behind an office of Greeks - of Cypriotes responsibility for maintenance and legality and order restoration on island that gave to Greeks of Cyprus the international recognition and serious advantage before Turks-Cypriotes admitted. The resolution confirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, recognising thus force of Arrangements of 1960 and calling the parties to restraint and force non-use. In it at the same time it was recommended to the Secretary general of the United Nations to appoint, in coordination with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and England, the intermediary for assistance to the problem permission on island: thereby, according to some Greek historians, necessity of revision tsjurihsko-London договоренностей.172 Besides, the resolution indirectly admitted provided a direction on island of forces ООН.173 Thus, in the spring of 1964 regulation of the Cyprian situation again (after experience of 50th) was taken out on United Nations level - in respect of realisation peace-making операции174 and formulations of possible offers on a conclusion of a political situation from deadlock. Novelty for the United Nations of a forthcoming political problem on Cyprus - intermediary in the conditions of the interethnic conflict complicated active «an external background», - did a problem of the Incorporated Nations absolutely uneasy. Acceptance of the resolution 186 SB the United Nations with simplification has been apprehended by the Greeks-Cypriotes who have begun a reorganisation of system of the government in the spirit of «13 amendments». So, in 1964-65 in the forced mode incorporated municipalities were established; the separate lists of voters assuming voting to an ethnic sign for the president and vitse - the president were abolished; the veto of the vice-president was cancelled; instead of the Greek-Cyprian legislative Chamber the Ministry of Education was created. Term of stay Makariosa on a post of the President lasted «before conditions normalisation»; powers of all turko-Cyprian selected representatives were not subject to prolongation. Simultaneously for restraint of probable Turkish intervention in April, 1964 Makariosom and the prime minister of Greece G.Papandreu the decision on a secret transfer to Cyprus the Greek division was accepted, 175 which by the summer has arrived on island (about 10 thousand foreheads). In June creation of the Greek-Cyprian National guards has begun; The Greek officers who have received there command posts were engaged in its training. It is remarkable, that to commanders of National guards became already known for the affairs on Cyprus G.Grivas. To summer of 1965 its number has made 14 thousand people; to it it is necessary to add also about 5 thousand Greek-Cyprian armed policemen. The military equipment, the weapon and an ammunition were delivered secretly from Greece. Thus Turkey continued to assist the weapon and insurgents to the Turks - besieged in enclaves to Cypriotes. As some sources testify, to Cyprus has been secretly thrown about thousand Turkish soldiers and officers; number turko - Cyprian «self-defence groups» made about 12 thousand боевиков.176 The intercommunal violence, meanwhile, proceeded in the spring and summer of 1964, having ochagovyj, though also intensive, character: operations flashed not so often, mentioned this or that strategically important site and lasted rather limited period of time. Nevertheless, against amplifying pressing the turko-Cyprian enclaves and taking into account a transfer to Cyprus the Greek armies, Turkey has made the decision on carrying out of the armed operation on island, according to the Contract on guarantees. Greece and Cyprus also have resulted the armies in a condition of the raised battle readiness. Seeming inevitable collision was possible to prevent the USA. American president L.Dzhonson has directed on June, 5th, 1964 to Turkish prime minister I.Inyonju the message in which specified in allied obligations of Greece and Turkey on NATO. He also warned, that disembarkation to Cyprus can cause intervention of the USSR, and allies of Ankara on NATO could not guarantee, that will protect Turkey, in case of its unilateral actions on the Cyprian direction without consent Альянса.177 The ultimatum has made heavy impression upon Ankara, having spoilt for some time all climate American-Turkish отношений.178 And though Turkey has been compelled to recede, I.Inyonju in the reciprocal message has underlined (13.06.1964), that Ankara reserves the right to operate according to positions of the international arrangements on Кипру.179 The USSR, prior to the beginning of 60th not showing activity on the Cyprian direction, began to behave nastupatelno in process of an aggravation of contradictions in NATO concerning Cyprus. So, Moscow has condemned NATO attempts to compel Makariosa to accept on island the Alliance contingent. On February, 7th, 1964 the USSR has accused the West of blasting of the sovereignty, independence and neutrality Кипра.180Помимо of political support Makariosu, the USSR expressed readiness to adjust delivery to island of the weapon and the military technics (air defence, a radar, torpedo boats, small arms). By estimations, in 1965 of the USSR has directed to Cyprus the military technics and property for the sum of 70 mln. dollars from which half - in the form of gratuitous помощи.181 Thus Moscow did not hide from Makariosa) that it especially disturbs intervention of Athenes on Cyprus and the scenario "enozisa". As have shown events, L.Dzhonson has seriously apprehended a position of the USSR. Disturbed by remaining threat of Greek-Turkish collision that would be obvious on a hand to Moscow, Washington has continued the active efforts on dialogue renewal between the parties of the Cyprian conflict. In June, 1964 to Athenes and Ankara again there has arrived the assistant to US State Secretary Dzh. Ball. Then (on June, 22nd and 24) Washington have visited for separate negotiations from L.Dzhonsonom prime ministers of Turkey and Greece I.Inyonju and G.Papandreu.182 the offer of Americans (on July, 2nd, 1964) about a tripartite meeting in Geneva, accepted as Athenes, 183 and Ankara became Result of this diplomatic activity. The secretary general of the United Nations At Tan welcomed the beginning of negotiations. Thus attract attention two moments: first, the American steps have been turned only to Athenes and Ankara, but in any way to the Cyprian communities. Secondly, the USA operated "in parallel" with the intermediary initiative of the United Nations started by the resolution 186 SB, and secured with only formal blessing from the Secretary general of the United Nations. The intermediary at negotiations in Geneva (July - August, 1964) D.Acheson holding at that time a post of the adviser of the US president on foreign policy questions acted. Thereupon the offered schemes of settlement became known in a historiography as «plan Achesona» though the plan in the form of the uniform document did not exist: some main principles of settlement which varied in a course переговоров.184Главный a message have been developed consisted in association of Cyprus with Greece ("enozis") at maintenance of military presence of Turkey on island and protection of the rights a Turk - of Cypriotes. So, in a northeast part of Cyprus (p Karpasija) creation of military base or «voenggoj zones» under the Turkish sovereignty («foreground Achesona») or on a hire basis for a period of 50 years («second plan Achesona») was provided. Thus in other territory of island creation of two-three turko-Cyprian homing areas ("foreground") or two turko-Cyprian "areas-cantons" («the second plan»), the status and which powers, however, it was not explained was supposed. Besides, Greece should transfer to Ankara located at coast of Turkey small island Kastellorizo. Ankara has assumed as a basis for negotiations "foreground", trying to achieve expansion of territory for base that in case of need all turko-Cyprian community there could take cover. Makarios has rejected idea of creation of Turkish base on Cyprus. Athenes have seen attempt of the disguised section of island in "foreground" and with some fluctuations caused by position Makariosa, have agreed to assume as a basis for negotiations «the second plan», at restriction, however, the areas of handed over base and rent term. Thus again considerable distinction in positions of Athenes and Nicosia was showed: their mutual discontent accrued, becoming the important element of the Cyprian situation. The offer of Athenes, however, has been rejected by Turkey. On August, 22nd, 1964 negotiations have been interrupted. It is interesting thus, that, judging by various sources, on the eve of a failure of negotiations Americans conducted work to provoke Athenes to declare about "enozise" and to admit (supervised by Washington) the answer of Ankara in the form of capture to territory relying to it on Cyprus - 11-13 % of island. Thus the USA expected to keep the parties from collision and to receive «in the dry rest» realisation in practice of the plan of D.Achesona bypassing Makariosa. Given rather risky plan in the Greek historiography.185 It has received the name «unilateral enozisa», however, has not been realised: at the last minute G.Papandreu has reversed. In parallel with diplomatic efforts in Geneva, events promptly developed on the Cyprus. In the beginning of August, 1964 Greeks - Cypriotes have led approach to a seaside turko-Cyprian enclave in area Tillirii through which to Cyprus from Turkey the weapon and insurgents was secretly thrown. Fierce fights with application of artillery and mortars were fastened. On August, 78th, 1964 the Turkish Air Forces have struck blows to the locations of the Greek - Cyprian armies on all island. Makarios in the answer has declared, that in case of repetition of touches it authorises ruthless storm of all turko-Cyprian enclaves. The government in Athenes has warned, that Greece will assist Cyprus all available средствами.186 SB the United Nations on August, 9th, 1964 has accepted the resolution with an appeal to cease-fire, but it was clear: Greece and Turkey stood on the verge of war. The USA, however, have not undertaken this time immediately active intervention, believing, that Turkish bombardments will cause a loss to forces of Greeks - of Cypriotes still before Athenes will dare at the armed answer. The American military men stated also serious doubts that Greece in general is capable to assist really Makariosu in view of the big distance from Cyprus L To the Greek air bases. Besides, in Washington believed, that Turkish blows will force Makariosa and Athenes to be more compliant and to accept «plan Achesona». Makarios, however, has addressed for the help directly to the USSR. The Soviet government has declared, that «if business will reach intrusion, Soviet Union does not remain aside» and «will assist Republic Cyprus in protection of its freedom and independence of foreign intervention».187 Against so unequivocal position of the USSR which have prevented, as a matter of fact, this time external intervention to Cyprus, operations on island have soon stopped. In general, estimating a policy of the USSR on the Cyprian direction in 60th, it is necessary to note its sufficient equation and suspension. On the one hand, the USSR aspired not to admit domination on island of any of the West countries and consequently supported the independent policy of Cyprus. On the other hand, in the Kremlin realised the importance of Turkey and aspired to loosen this important link of NATO, developing relations with Ankara. Against L.Dzhonsona's categorical letter from June, 5th, 1964 where the USA have specified Turkey its place, Soviet-Turkish communications in 1964-65 have received a sudden impulse. In November, 1964 to the USSR there has arrived the head Turkish F.Erkin's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in 1965 minindel the USSR A.A.Gromyko has visited Ankara, and the prime minister of Turkey S.Urpoplju - Москву.188В 1966 in Turkey (and Greece) has visited the Chairman of Ministerial council A.N.Kosygin, and in 1967 Turkish prime minister S.Demirel has made visit in СССР.189В result of these meetings variety of agreements on development of economic, cultural and scientific and technical cooperation has been signed. Moscow, in general, and planned further the actions on the Cyprian direction, aspiring to the balanced account of own interests round Cyprus and paying special attention to communications with Turkey. The report of the representative of the Secretary general of the United Nations across Cyprus Galo Plazy 190 Unlike D.Achesona's approach became on March, 26th, 1965 attempt following after D.Achesona to offer contours of the Cyprian settlement, the report considered as a problem core the intercommunal conflict on island. G.Plaza ascertained serious - at times diametrical - a divergence of positions of Greeks - and Turks-Cypriotes and on the basis of the analysis of Agreements 1959 and experience of their realisation in 1960-63 did a conclusion about necessity of search of a new format of intercommunal settlement and impossibility of return to the status quo of 1960 In the report full demilitarisation of Cyprus was offered and necessity of preservation of the uniform state without geographical separation of communities admitted. Concerning the rights of Turks-Cypriotes granting of an autonomy by it concerning religion and culture was offered at corresponding strict guarantees and introduction of a post of the special commissioner of the United Nations on monitoring of a situation with human rights on Cyprus. In the report also it was recommended to remove restrictions from the independent status of Cyprus, having given to Cypriotes the right to full self-determination. At the same time G.Plaza warned, that immediate realisation "enozisa" will lead to the power answer of Ankara and destabilises conditions, therefore, in its opinion, Greeks-Cypriotes should reject such variant. The report has received an ambiguous estimation from participants of the Cyprian situation: Athenes and Makarios were inclined to assume it as a basis for the further dialogue; at the same time Ankara and Turks-Cypriotes have rejected the report as unilateral and "Progreek".191 Failure of efforts of the United Nations has returned again dialogue across Cyprus in frameworks of bilateral negotiations of Athenes and Ankara, despite objections Makariosa. Support of the given format from Washington and London has made inefficient attempts of the Secretary general of the United Nations to direct to Cyprus the new representatives (after resignation Galo Plazy in December, 1965) for proshchupyvanija soils in February and March 1966 года.192 Private preparatory steps at bilateral level have led to a meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey on June, 9th, 1966 in Paris. Further dialogue proceeded during meetings of representatives of two countries in the European capitals. The first stage of contacts (June - December, 1966) has come to the end with signing of the bilateral memorandum (on December, 17th, 1966) 193 which only stated positions of the parties. So, Athenes supported realisation "enozisa" by granting to Ankara and Turks-Cypriotes of certain indemnifications (military base, most likely on a hire basis, wide suffrages etc.). Ankara suggested to keep independence of Cyprus or to develop the form of "joint management" of Greece and Turkey. Besides, Turks insisted on reception of military base under the full sovereignty. Thus the parties agreed to provide demilitarisation of all other territory of island. Considering firm position Makariosa and sudbonosnost forthcoming decisions, on February, 6th, 1967 in Athenes under presidency of the king special Council about the Cyprian problematics to which has been invited Makarios has taken place. Despite objections of the Archbishop specifying, that granting of Turkey bases on Cyprus will create a constant source of intensity in Greek-Turkish relations, Council has supported continuation of dialogue with Анкарой.194 The second stage of contacts took place in February - September, 1967, that is and after an establishment in Athenes military junta on April, 21st, 1967. On September, 9-10th, 1967 on Greek-Turkish border in Thrace the meeting of premieres - of ministers of two countries K.Koljasa and S.Demirelja has taken place. Athenes have suggested Ankara to agree again on "enozis" Cyprus with Greece in exchange for transfer of Turkey to territory, this time in the western Thrace. S.Demirel has rejected "enozis" basically and has made old Turkish demands. The meeting has come to the end безрезультатно.195 Failure of bilateral dialogue of Athenes and Ankara across Cyprus stimulated again interest to United Nations format, and in September-October, 1967 minindel Cyprus S.Kiprianu met the Secretary general of the United Nations during session of HECTARES of the United Nations three times. Itself At Tan it was declined to present soon in SB the offer United Nations on razblokirovaniju intercommunal dialogue on Cyprus. At the same time this intention has met at once opposition from Turkey, the USA and London, continuing to insist on the "limited" international format of dialogue across Cyprus. Besides existing before the reasons, now this point of view was caused by the general strain of relations of the West from the USSR in connection with events in the Near East (six-day war in June, 1967). Arising discussion has appeared, however, is interrupted by a crisis aggravation of conditions on Cyprus: having ignored Makariosa, the military management of Greeks-Cypriotes (G.Grivas) in November, 1967 has given the order on attack of two turko-Cyprian villages on strategically important line from port Limassol in Nicosia. Persistent resistance of Turks-Cypriotes and intervention of a contingent of the United Nations has broken plans of Greeks-Cypriotes. Turkey nemedleshju has mobilised the armies, and, threatening with intrusion, has categorically demanded from Athenes of a conclusion from island of the Greek armies, G.Grivasa's 196 responses, dissolution of National guards, indemnification of the damage put to Turks-Cypriotes and a recognition of legitimacy generated by them in enclaves of administrative and police bodies. The situation has begun to smell gunpowder. On November, 22nd the USA, the Great Britain and Canada have acted with the tripartite initiative on the termination of the crisis, providing a conclusion from Cyprus all Greek and Turkish military men, except provided by the Contract on the union, strengthening of peace-making forces of the United Nations, payment of indemnification to Turks - to Cypriotes for the suffered damage and refusal of Turkey of application of military force against Cyprus. American special representative S.Vens has been directed to Athenes, Ankara and Nicosia - for pressing rendering, basically, on греков.197 With the same purpose Greece and Turkey were visited by the Secretary general of NATO M.Brozio. The USSR has made responsible for a crisis aggravation NATO and the Greek soldiery. The parity of forces was obvious not in favour of Athenes, and they have made concessions. To the middle of January, 1968 the Greek armies thrown to Cyprus over the established quota, were выведены.198 Turks-Cypriotes on December, 29th, 1967 have proclaimed creation of "Time Turkish administration of Cyprus». Explosion hazard of a situation round Cyprus has induced SB the United Nations at session on December, 22nd, 1967 again to consider this question and to call the Secretary general - within the limits of mission of "kind services» - to promote prevention of new crises and the beginning of intercommunal negotiations. At the initiative of the Secretary general such dialogue has begun summer of 1968 The outcome of November crisis 1967 which have ended de facto with capitulation of Athenes, had, besides other, the important "ideological" value for Greeks - of Cypriotes. It became definitively clear to the overwhelming majority of the population, that "enozis", despite the appeal, cannot be carried out in view of a position of Turkey. Comprehension of it was eloquently confirmed also with results of presidential elections on February, 25th, 1968: Makarios, conducted pre-election campaign under the slogan of unequivocal refusal from "enozisa" in favour of full independence of Cyprus, has got support of 95,45 % (!) of Greeks-Cypriotes. Bringing a short result to the paragraph, it is necessary to note, what exactly the period 1964 - has appeared 67 defining for vpisyvanija the Cyprian conflict in the international foreign policy context. The Cyprian question, thus, definitively was beyond the Greek-Turkish-British communications and has received stably wide international measurement which basic vectors have remained then on long time prospect. These years have appeared mechanisms of regulation of the Cyprian situation as single whole from external multilateral (the United Nations and NATO) and state (the USA and the USSR) participants of the complex of relations generated round Cyprus are fulfilled. The short judgement of crises 1964 - shows 67 the major role of the USA and the USSR in regulation of a situation round Cyprus. Besides, more and more deep involvement into opposition on Cyprus in 1964 - 67 of Athenes and Ankara sometimes forced to assume, that the basic problem consists not in the intercommunal conflict of Greeks - and Turks-Cypriotes on island, and consists in a border dispute of Greece and Turkey. The specified substitution, along with uncertainty of a format of negotiations (transitions from "partial" to "full" internationalisation), considerably complicated settlement attempts as has recoded an essence of contradictions and differently placed accents. Besides the question was outlined: how much interests of Athenes and Ankara coincided with interests of Cypriotes? Against intercommunal contradictions and Greeks - and Turks-Cypriotes required support of "the related countries». The question on identity of interests, however, already dramaticheski rose in relations between Greeks-Cypriotes and Athenes and theoretically could appear between Turks of Cyprus and Ankara. To the analysis of a new coil of development of the Cyprian situation, the armed intervention to Cyprus from the outside of became which basic result (1974), the following paragraph is devoted.
<< | >>
A source: Bredikhin, Oleg Nikolaevich. Cyprus conflict: the genesis and the main stages of development / thesis / Moscow. 2006

More on topic §2. Attempts of the "limited" and "full" internationalisation of the Cyprian conflict (1964-67):

  1. subjects POV in a position "patriot" - "proponent" and "opponent" - "analyst"
  2. § 1. Genesis of terms "promise", "bribe" and "lihoimstvo" by the Russian right XIV-has begun XX centuries
  3. Teoretiko-legal research of a parity of concepts «the person,« the physical person, "citizen", "person", "individual", "Everyone"
  4. about the legal maintenance of concepts "protection", "protection", "preservation" and «steady use»
  5. § 1. Concepts "subject" and "object" of the operating criminal legislation, judiciary practice, philosophy and jurisprudence
  6. 3.2. B.Akunina's project "Genres" - a collection of "pure" genre samples
  7. 3.2. Information support of acceptance of administrative decisions in a battalion "supply" oao "agromash-holding"
  8. 1.4.1. The typological characteristic of a modality through a prism filologiyocheskoj germenevtiki: opposition of concepts "value" and "sense"
  9. § 3.3 Justices of soul and justice of the policy in "State" and Platon's "Laws"
  10. "identification" of corporation with other connected persons ("identity") and «getting responsibility»
  11. § 1.1. Concept "abstract" both "concrete": philosophical and legal аспектні