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§2. Strengthening of intercommunal pressure on island after the Second World War (1945-1958)

After the Second World War the Greek-Cyprian requirement about joining of Cyprus to Greece has begun to sound against lifting of national-liberation movement all over the world. The offer of London (October, 1946) on convocation of Consultative assembly with participation of representatives of both communities for development of the new constitution and system of self-management of island became the answer.
On Cyprus the given initiative have apprehended ambiguously. Turks-Cypriotes have joined work of Assembly and have supported the project of the constitution offered by British. Nationalist «the Patriotic fraction» Greeks - of Cypriotes from participation has refused, unconditionally demanding "enozis" and trying to discredit all idea of an autonomy of Cyprus within the limits of the British sovereignty. The left spectrum of the Greek-Cyprian community (supporters of "Progressive party of the working people» AKEL - heiresses forbidden by British in 1931 of Communist Party of Cyprus) has been split: its part opposed Assemblies, another saw in it possibility to fix the certain compromise for the further escalating of requirements about full self-determination. As a result it has been decided to join meeting, but at once to interrupt negotiations if "imperialists" do not make concessions. The project of the constitution presented by British causes different estimations. On the one hand, some authors, including the Greek origin, believe its worked enough for the time and условий.67 With another - is underlined, that in it the high level of development of consciousness of Cypriotes and degree of popularity of idea "enozisa".68 have not been considered As it is represented, London actually was afraid excessive liberalisation of the constitution in addition to strengthen aspiration of Greeks - of Cypriotes to association with Greece and to aggravate a situation. Nevertheless, the work of Assembly proceeding till August, 1948, was serious attempt to find mutually acceptable outcomes. At successful coincidence of circumstances the similar practice applied by the Great Britain also in other colonies, could, by a recognition of the majority of researchers, and on Cyprus to lead to gradual peace finding by autonomy island, and then and независимости.69 As the British researchers testify, is primary in London really there were reasons in favour of the compromise. However rigidity of a position of Greeks - of Cypriotes, along with fear concessions to strengthen communists from AKEL have forced London to correct the намерения.70 In view of deadlock at negotiations the Greek-Cyprian participants have left Assembly, and "enozis" has prevailed as a result as an overall aim Cyprian right and the majority of the left: in a traditional Greek-Cyprian society communistic ideas of the internationalism which did not have wide prospects, have been compelled to adapt at some stage the purpose of association with Greece, were indisputable in the internal political agenda. Real distinction between right and left began to consist, as a matter of fact, only in means of achievement same. And if in Assembly AKEL supported a wide autonomy and full self-determination of island then this line has been declared by erroneous, and immediate association with Athenes became main задачей.71 By means of given updating AKEL expected to expand the influence among Greeks-Cypriotes.
It, however, has not occurred in connection with a position of traditionally authoritative church on Cyprus, branding communists as enemies of the God, "enozisa" and ellinizma; then charges AKEL in treachery and spinelessness in relation to Turks-Cypriotes have followed. As a result on a boundary 40-50 h AKEL it has appeared pushed aside on the second plan. Compelled to meet heavy crisis of change of a management (1952), the party to the end of 50th remained in изоляции.72 As a result a leading role in the Greek community have received nationalists, whose policy has aggravated and without that the tense relations with England and has appreciably predetermined the further course of events. Degree of indisputable popularity "enozisa" at Greeks-Cypriotes was eloquently shown by the plebiscite organised in January, 1950 by church: 95,7 % of having the right to vote Greeks of Cyprus have supported "enozis"; 73turki-Cypriotes in overwhelming majority of participation in plebiscite have not accepted. Thus it is important to mean, that the Greek-Cyprian nationalists, unlike communists, brought an attention to the question not about granting to the people of Cyprus of the right to self-determination (the subsequent will of the majority, taking into account a demographic situation on island, anyhow would lead Cyprus to association with Greece), and demanded only "enozis" and немедленно.74 Similar straightforwardness did not change an essence of the matter, but deprived a position of Greeks-Cypriotes of any flexibility and the national-liberation argument: "enozis" in such kind resembled more likely island Greece annexation. The maximalism of requirements of Greeks-Cypriotes limited space for the compromise with the Great Britain. By the end 40 - to the beginning of 50th in connection with disintegration of British Empire Cyprus began to see to London the main base in East Mediterranean and a strategic balcony to the Near East. Against increase of the Arabian nationalism and penetration into region USSR Cyprus for short time has found that key value in the opinion of British, which else in 1878 to it prime minister B.Dizraeli designated. Island deduction by granting to it of the limited autonomy within the limits of the British sovereignty, however, did not suit Greeks-Cypriotes. Simultaneously growth of the Greek-Cyprian nationalism caused the increasing concern in the Turks-Cypriotes consolidated before threat "enozisa". According to census of 1946, Turks made about 18 percent from 450 thousand population Кипра.75 Seeing in London the guarantor of the safety, they supported preservation of the status quo or, in case of its change, for "return" of Cyprus Turkey. In 1948 in Nicosia there has passed the first large demonstration against "enozisa" with participation of 15 thousand Turks-Cypriotes. Greeks-Cypriotes, however, underestimated and ignored a role of a Turkish community, the policy only strengthening its fears. Simple assurances about garantirovannosti at "enozise" the rights of minority did not satisfy Turks-Cypriotes, owing to historical circumstances applying on bolshee, than the status of a simple national minority. As a whole, in 1945-55 Politicisation of the turko-Cyprian community accrued, being expressed in its more and more active opposition "enozisu" and in occurrence of the requirement of section of Cyprus ("taksim").76 Ankara too started to watch closely more and more a situation on the Cyprian direction, showing natural liking to requirements a Turk-kipriotov.77 Besides, the potential of Turkey during an epoch growing «cold war» transformed Ankara into a key element of international-political system to the Mediterranean, on Near and Middle East. By a boundary of 40-50th the condition of intercommunal communications, however, did not foretell inevitable collision. Representatives of communities on the whole continued to get on peacefully with each other: on island there were 146 mixed villages (for comparison: in 112 villages the population was completely turko-Cyprian, and in 369 - Greek-Cyprian); 78 in cities where always there were monoethnic quarters, intensity too not ощущалась.79 At the same time THE RUSSIAN STATE LIBRARY Harmonious and often friendly coexistence simple a Turk - and Greeks - of Cypriotes misled ardent supporters "enozisa", believing, that the Turkish community is not capable to resistance. The scornful thesis that Turks of Cyprus on the whole are not the "present" Turks, and the Greeks who have accepted Islam of Cyprus became chauvinism top. The similar approach only strengthened moods of extreme turko-Cyprian elements, shaking the general situation. In the late forties in the Greek-Cyprian community have appeared for the first time plans of the armed realisation "enozisa". For their discussion in 1951 - 53 Cyprus were visited time and again by the future leader of the Greek-Cyprian insurgents the retired officer of the Greek army G.Grivas - the Cypriote by origin, the supporter of the extremely right nationalist sights. Thus, the philosophy of use of all means and ways for the sake of sacred national business found practical filling. The position of Greece in the relation "enozisa" was dual. Pressure of public opinion, in particular after plebiscite of 1950, and conviction in historical inevitability of association of Cyprus and "mother-gretsii" 80 was declined by Athenes to support of Greeks-Cypriotes. At official level further cautious statements business, however, did not go, as strategic value of the union with London was for the weakened civil war 1946-49 of the country is indisputable. The phrase of the vice-president of the government of Greece G.Papandreu (1950) that «Ellada breathes two lungs - English and American became winged, and cannot risk for the sake of Cyprus to be lost from asfiksii».81Показательно, that Greece at all did not lift the Cyprian theme at the Parisian peace conference of the 1946 which fixed results of the Second World War and have issued transfer by Italy of Greece of Dodekanezsky islands. At the same time a victory over communists (1949), reorientation to the USA as the basic ally, the introduction into NATO (1952), and also a victory on elections in November, 1952 of marshal A.Papagosa - the firm supporter "enozisa" - have led to that Athenes began to behave on the Cyprian direction more initiatively. So, at first Greece at bilateral level has cautiously offered, that London guaranteed the decision of the Cyprian question on the basis of the right of the people of island to self-determination - in reasonable terms - in exchange for granting of the Great Britain of bases on Cyprus and, probably, in territory of Greece. The offer has been rejected. Discussion of the Cyprian problematics between Ministers for Foreign Affairs of two countries within the limits of the NATO meeting in Rome (November, 1951) has without results come to the end . Further the Great Britain began to refuse to discuss the Cyprian question, considering it as internal дела.82Так, it has not been included in the agenda of negotiations English minindel by E.Idena (Athenes, 1954). Similar the position of London was by preparation of not taken place visit to the Great Britain the A.Papagosa. As the minister of affairs of colonies of G.Hopkinson (July, 1954) has declared concerning Cyprus, «in Commonwealth there are certain territories which, in view of special circumstances, never can count on full independence».83 Being afraid of connection to the Cyprian situation of Turkey, Athena initially excluded possibility of formation of the joint block with Ankara on the Cyprian question - despite sufficient constructibility of relations of two countries to the beginning of 50th the Similar decision has been dictated by that Greeks, as well as Greeks-Cypriotes, till the certain moment considered the Cyprian situation exclusively through a prism "enozisa". Thereupon the basis for a common position with Ankara was absent. Dagshaja the position was vulnerable: taking into account demographic and politiko-geographical realities on Cyprus Turkish interest would become sooner or later inevitable. Conscious refusal of attempts to adjust understanding with Ankara limited space for maneuver and transferred the initiative on an establishment of contacts to Turkey to British. As researchers mark, ignoring by Athenes of interests of Turkey, and Greeks - Cypriotes - fears a Turk of Cyprus became the key reasons which have provoked complication Cyprian situation. Aspiring to strengthen the trunk-call position, Greece as a result has made the decision on internationalisation of the Cyprian question and on August, 16th, 1954 has brought of it for discussion in ООН.1 Some days after inquiry has been added by corresponding representation of the Greek-Cyprian community. Discussion in a format of General Assembly has not brought, however, desirable result. The West countries, afraid to allow an occasion of the USSR to get through Cyprus into region of East Mediterranean and the Near East, have supported a position of the Great Britain. At the same time to the states which have recently received independence - India, Indonesia, to Egypt - the problem reminded more likely colonial dispute. Turkey which was not showing before interest to Cyprus, has taken advantage of a tribune of the United Nations for charge of Greece in ekspansionizme and ignoring of opinion of a considerable part of the population of island. As a result of December, 17th, 1954 Genassambleja the United Nations have rejected the Greek reference. In a historiography discussion of a relativity of timeliness of the Greek initiative and correctness of the elite - offensive in support "enozisa" - формулировок.2 Criticizing the given step for excessive straightforwardness proceeds, admits, nevertheless, that it has drawn for the first time wide world attention to the Cyprian question and has marked the first attempt of giving to it of a format of the international problem. Before declaration of independence of Cyprus (1960) the Cyprian question was taken out in the United Nations still four times; considerable progress, however, it has not been noted. If in 1955 session Genassamblei the United Nations have rejected its inclusion in the agenda in 1956 the problem was discussed on made practically simultaneously, but separately to representations of Greece and the Great Britain: Athenes insisted on realisation by Cypriotes of the right to self-determination, London accused Greece of support of "terrorists" on island where since 1955 movement for "enozis" has got the form of the armed struggle. The resolution 1013 (XI) 26 became a result L February, 1957 in which support «peace was expressed, democratic and 1 This idea was discussed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece and earlier: see, in particular, Oiazxq yia that Kolrkhko from NOT / Eto ^ 1952, 1/01/1952 - 31/12/1952 FjkeHo? 32, UtsosrakgHa; 5, ttsgshcha 1 - Positions across Cyprus in the United Nations / 1952 the Folder № 32, 1.01.1952 - 31.12.1952, section 5, a part 1. 2 See, in particular: L.Vlahos TSit. Soch. - with. 68 or Dzermias P.Tsit. Soch. - T.1 with. 204-207 To the fair decision », according to principles and the United Nations purposes, also it was recommended to carry on negotiations. During twelfth session Genassamblei (1957) the resolution to accept it was not possible (voting on December, 14th, 1957) as the project has not typed demanded two thirds of voices. At the same time its formulation (the recommendation about carrying out of additional negotiations for application on Cyprus of a principle of self-determination) and the fact is indicative, that for the first time the Greek position has been approved in the United Nations by the majority - simple - voices. The resolution 1287 (XIII) repeated on December, 5th, 1958, in general, positions of the resolution 1013 (XI) 1957 84 In new quality campaign for "enozis" has passed on April, 1st, 1955 when secret Greek-Cyprian organisation EOKA has carried out the first armed actions against the British objects. Activity EOKA is estimated ambiguously. According to one, its contribution to clearing of Cyprus was the major, despite the admitted extreme measures: though and it is clear, that in the military plan to force Englishmen capitulate EOKA could not, its actions have supposedly drawn to Cyprus the international attention, have forced British to recognise presence of a problem and to address to searches of variants of its political settlement. At the same time, according to others, actions EOKA promoted that "enozis" as a result and has not been realised, and intercommunal communications have received heavy травму.85 Number EOKA, conceived as compact it is good zakonspirirovannaja grouping, made at first no more than 50 active fighters and never exceeded several hundreds. Secret character and rigid methods deprived EOKA of unanimous support though it and was popular, especially in the environment of the Greek-Cyprian youth. At the same time AKEL, whose supporters was exposed to attacks and intimidations from insurgents, has condemned EOKA and even has organised manifestations of protest against "terrorists" (January, 1958). The statistics of activity EOKA - since April, 1955 till August, 1958 when the organisation declared an armistice, - is indicative and confirms the thesis that EOKA bore in itself a conflict germ in the most Greek-Cyprian общине.86 So, for 1955 it had been organised 699 actions, 12 British and 12 Greeks - of Cypriotes are killed; for 1956 - 499 actions, 81 British (military men, officials and civilians), 113 Greeks-Cypriotes and 16 Turks-Cypriotes is killed; and т.д.87 Thus, more than half of victims were made by Greeks-Cypriotes - so-called "collaborators" and spineless to a Turkish community left. G.Grivasa's independence and its numerous refusals to follow instructions of a political management (including Athenes, whence insurgents received the weapon and volunteers) deprived of action of Greeks-Cypriotes of coordination, dezorientiruja London concerning their real intentions. On a plan of Archbishop Makariosa, from means of church financing insurgents, 88 EOKA should support only the political requirement "enozisa", making as much as possible bloodless diversions, mainly, against military objects. G.Grivas, on the contrary, considered the armed struggle by unique way of achievement of the purposes and was not legible in means. As a result in activity EOKA one was accented that, other component. London from its part did not see a difference in positions Makariosa and G.Grivasa, considering, that for EOKA stood itself Архиепископ.89 Besides, British obviously guessed, that the secret help to insurgents is rendered by Greece. Terrorist activity EOKA had especially heavy consequences for intercommunal relations. According to G.Grivasa's representations, war was conducted on four fronts: against British, Turks-Cypriotes, «traitors enozisa» and communists, becoming more active at different stages on this or that direction. As a result among victims EOKA there were Turks-Cypriotes from structure were on service at British of auxiliary police and mobile резерва.90 In this connection a number of researchers believes, that the basic responsibility for the beginning of intercommunal bloodshed is born by the London involving divisions completed with Turks-Cypriotes for struggle against "guerrillas". There are also data on the loyal relation of British to turko - to the Cyprian fighting groups created for struggle against supporters "enozisa" and AND Receiving the secret help from Turkey. Apologists of Englishmen underline, however, that London did not have a special intention to involve Cypriotes in bloody civil strife as it is traditional in power structures a share of Turks-Cypriotes, in a proportion to number of their ethnic group, always was much more above, than греков.91 On a side of power opposition of a community have put attacks EOKA on a Turk - of the Cypriotes co-operating with the British administration. Firing in Nicosia between insurgents of both communities (1958) have compelled London to establish a dividing line between ethnic quarters of capital - border of the first section of Cyprus. In 1958 in a Turkish community independent bodies of communal self-management have started to be created. In the end of July, 1958 the first case of mass resettlement of Turks-Cypriotes in an enclave of compact residing of a Turkish community has been noted: many left, being rescued from EOKA; others to resettlement were compelled by the turko-Cyprian insurgents. Then in a Turkish community campaign of boycott of the Greek-Cyprian goods, supported with propagation and intimidation from the turko-Cyprian extremists has begun. Nationalists of both communities, thus, used terror against those representatives of the ethnic generality who supported restoration of intercommunal interaction. In London have quickly estimated danger of consequences of destabilization of conditions on Cyprus for the British strategic interests in region. Already on June, 30th, 1955, i.e. all in three months after the beginning of actions EOKA, the Great Britain has addressed to Greece and Turkey with the offer on carrying out of a tripartite meeting at level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Officially discussion of military-political conditions in the Near East and in the Mediterranean was a theme of the conference which has taken place in London on August, 29th - on September, 7th, 1955; actually, however, the key moment was the situation on Cyprus. Connection to negotiations of Athenes and Ankara meant itself the first formal recognition London of their interests on island; thereby, the complex of political interaction round the Cyprian problem "institutsionalno" was supplemented with new actors. In a historiography there is an opinion according to which the consent of Greece to take part in the London conference was an error for thereby Athenes recognised a vote in the Cyprian question and beyond Turkey; London is accused of promotion of Ankara for a role of counterbalance Греции.92 At the same time connection of Athenes to negotiations meant change of a position of London about the Cyprian question as about the vnutretgem business - Greece achieved it. With the account of realities of the Cyprian situation the recognition of interests of Turkey on island was, apparently, inevitable. Offered by British at conference the constitution project («Macmillan's plan») gave to Cyprus the limited autonomy in frameworks L The British sovereignty. Athenes have frostily expressed in its relation, leaving possibility for discussion continuation. At the same time Turkey has rejected at once the project, supporting the preservation of the status quo providing safety of Turks-Cypriotes, in their opinion, more reliably. In days of conference (on September, 6th, 1955) in Istanbul and Izmir the wave of pogroms against the Greek community, organised as it was found out then, the Turkish authorities has swept - has been destroyed and damaged over 700 houses, about 900 shops, 80 churches. Greek-Turkish relations concerning Cyprus накалялись.93 On the island the British authorities have entered voeshjue position and have involved for struggle with EOKA additional forces. Simultaneously in September, 1955 governor Dzh. Hardiig has suggested the leader of the Greek-Cyprian community to Archbishop Makariosu to begin negotiations. The given step was especially indicative, as thereby Makarios de facto admitted the representative of all Cypriotes: Turks - Cypriotes have not been invited to negotiations. Dialogue proceeded from October, 1955 till March, 1956 and was, according to commentators, good possibility for development компромисса.94 Basic change of an English position was expressed that London recognised for the first time possibility of granting to Cypriotes of the right to self-determination. On Cyprus it was offered to establish system of self-management within the limits of the British sovereignty, and a question on self-determination to solve on a referendum in 10 years. The referendum prospect, however, was arranged with foggy conditions (conformity of realisation of a principle of self-determination to strategic interests of London, the account of opinion of allies, a guarantee of maintenance of expectations of all groups of the population etc.) Also became rather uncertain. During a transition period reduced as a result of negotiations till 7 years, the executive power would belong to the government with participation of representatives of both communities led by the Greek-Cypriote. The legislature was transferred to the parliament selected Cypriotes according to proportions of ethnic structure of the population. The British Governor kept powers in sphere of external relations and in questions of maintenance of internal security. Objections of Greeks-Cypriotes were reduced by three moments: Makarios supported transfer to the local government of powers on safety and public order maintenance, for increase in representation of Greeks - of Cypriotes in parliament and the government, and also for the announcement of the general amnesty for members EOKA. Nevertheless, considering reached as a step on a way to "enozisu", the Archbishop was afraid to miss «a titmouse in hands». Athenes (the prime minister - minister K.Karamanlis and minindel S.Teotokis) occupied a waiting attitude. On February, 29th, 1956 the British minister of affairs of colonial possession A.Lennoks-Bojd was connected to negotiations. And nevertheless outlined compromise Makariosom has been rejected. It should search for an explanation in a position of extreme Greek-Cyprian nationalists led by G.Grivasom and metropolitan Kerinii Kiprianosom. They initially were against «transactions with colonizers», preaching «enozis or death». At meeting Makariosa with G.Grivasom and Kiprianosom the prospect of split among Greeks-Cypriotes and even civil войны95 has come to light so obviously, that the Archbishop has decided to insist on full realisation of the requirements. In turn the British not trusting Makariosu and considering it secret L Leader EOKA, believed sufficient already made proposals. Besides in the London more and more became more active "irreconcilable" - ' supporters of power actions. As a result one of the most appreciable attempts of the permission of the Cyprian question has come to the end with a failure. However, estimations of potential of its viability are rather reserved: settlement would not be long-term in connection with aspiration of Greeks-Cypriotes to association with Greece (instead of it is simple to "self-determination") and unacceptability "enozisa" for Englishmen. Besides the Turkish factor was insufficiently considered also. Right after a failure of negotiations Makarios - J. Harding on Cyprus the wave of reprisals has begun. Leaders of Greeks-Cypriotes have been arrested, some of them, including Makarios, exiled. It has yielded, however, return result: in the opinion of the international public opinion the Archbishop has got an aura of the martyr. To suppress EOKA also it was not possible: despite a number of successes of British, G.Grivas has not been neutralised, and attacks of insurgents proceeded, forcing to search for new possibilities for the compromise. To same London pushed the USA which were afraid, that the situation on Cyprus is capable to complicate relations of members of NATO and to loosen southeast flank of an alliance. The confidence of the Great Britain of key importance of Cyprus for the strategic interests has only got stronger after Suez crisis (October-November, 1956). In December, 1956 Alennoks-Bojd has visited Greece and Turkey and has presented a new variant of constitutional device Kipra.96 «Plan Redkliffa» - by name the known British lawyer - repeated, basically, the project of J. Hardinga, but in comparison with it gave to Greeks-Cypriotes of more places in Legislative Assembly; speeches about the right to self-determination, however, were not. Preservation under the authority of the British Governor of sphere of external relations, defence and internal security Was supposed by transfer of other powers to the local government and elective Legislative Assembly. It was planned to found also the Supreme court and the separate body, called to provide the right of Turks-Cypriotes. Representing the plan to the House of Commons (on December, 19th, 1956), A.Lennoks-Bojd has declared, that one of prospects is «double self-determination» ethnic L Components of the population of Cyprus. Thereby British officially supposed for the first time basic possibility of section of island. It has caused negative reaction in Athenes concerning all plan; Turkey has agreed to assume it as a basis for negotiations. An In exile leader of Greeks - of Cypriotes Makarios from its part has refused to discuss the British offers. In 1957 the situation on Cyprus was partially normalised. EOKA declared a time suspension of operations (on March, 14th); from the reference has been released Makarios (on March, 28th); by the end of year of governor Dzh. Hardinga, the supporter of power measures, has replaced having a reputation for softer politician H.Fut. He has suggested to begin negotiations with leaders of both communities, to cancel the martial law on Cyprus, and to establish a transition period in 5-7 years from the moment of the statement of the mutually acceptable decision before its definitive coming into force. The decision appeared in a kind of "the postponed self-determination» for all Cyprus (thereby it was excluded "taksim", but not "enozis") by granting on island of bases of the Great Britain and, probably, Turkey. In January-February, 1958 the plan was discussed English minindel by S.Llojdom in Athenes and Ankara. As a result, however, it has been rejected: for Greeks unacceptable there was a creation on Cyprus Turkish base; for a Turk - probability "enozisa".97 The new initiative assumed even more active involving in the Cyprian settlement of "external" participants. « Macmillan's plan »98 - by name the British prime minister who has presented to its House of Commons in June, 1958 - provided establishment on Cyprus triple English-Greek-Turkish with - upravlepija with appointment at the British Governor of official representatives of the governments of Greece and Turkey; data tridominium should define within seven years the definitive status of island. The plan assumed granting to Cypriotes of a dual citizenship (British and Greek/Turkish on a choice) and establishment at level of communities of self-government institutions. For the Governor powers in sphere of external activity, defence and internal security (thus decisions should be accepted by all triumvirate) remained; the internal competence was transferred to special council with participation of the Governor, representatives of the governments of Greece and Turkey, and also Greeks - and Turks-Cypriotes. Details of system of self-management of Cyprus were offered to be developed to representatives of both communities, Greece and Turkey. Further London expected to provide the constant military presence on island. Reaction to the given plan was ambiguous. On the one hand, complexity of offered model tridomipiuma was evident. With another - after initially negative reaction caused, more likely, tactical reasons, Ankara has cautiously agreed to start its realisation, having appointed in September, 1958 of the representative at the Governor of Cyprus. Thereupon Athenes and Greeks-Cypriotes have appeared in a difficult situation: estimating «plan Makmilpana» as unacceptable, they did not wish to reject it from a threshold, being afraid of transformation tridomipiuma in britano-Turkish bilateral kondominium} Thus, however, the situation compelled to actions, and in September, 1958 Makarios has spoken against the plan, for the first time publicly having offered alternatively granting to Cyprus independence under United Nations guarantees. Athenes have in turn addressed for intermediary to the Secretary general of NATO of Item Spaaku, noticing, that persistence of London and Ankara at realisation of "plan Makmilpana» can call into question a place and a role of Greece in an alliance. The NATO, from giving of the USA, has suggested the parties to hold a meeting in a five-sided format - with participation of the Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and both communities - for development AND The compromise. The given offer has been rejected (October, 1958): under the pressure of nationalists Makarios again has returned on a position "enozisa"; Athenes have supported it, urging to expand a five-sided format by attraction of the "impartial" countries. Activity on the Cyprian direction all accrued, however notable advancement on a way to normalisation all was not. By the end of 50th of the XX-th century in the Cyprian question more and more clearly lines of intercommunal intensity, thus, began appear. The main characteristic of the Cyprian situation still there was an opposition of Greeks - of Cypriotes and London in connection with island self-determination, but regulation of intercommunal mutual relations already got special importance. As it has been shown, after the Second World War termination a national-liberation component of the Cyprian question which has accepted on Cyprus the form of movement for "enozis", it has appeared added with the intercommunal contradictions complicated by struggle of influential extremist groups from both parties. At a certain stage interethnic communications have become aggravated to level of power opposition. The main responsibility for complication of relations of Greeks - and Turks-Cypriotes lays, as it is represented, on communities of island. Having appeared under the influence of extreme nationalist elements, they have not managed soberly to estimate objective interests each other and have not tried to formulate them so that to exclude danger of a head-on collision. Apparently, the first the initiative Greeks-Cypriotes here should show, whose political consciousness developed faster rates. Policy of the Great Britain, long time not supposing wide self-management (let alone self-determination) for Cyprus and trying to use a conservative position of a Turkish community of island for neutralisation of requirements of Greeks-Cypriotes, promoted deterioration of a climate of intercommunal interaction, but was not its original cause. Interest of Greece and Turkey in support rendering to "related communities» also complicated conditions, but was all the same only additional factor, though also rather important. Plurality of participants of the Cyprian situation complicated the compromise coordination of their interests. Nevertheless, soon (February, 1959) the compromise in the form of the tsjurihsko-London agreements nevertheless has been reached. dogovoreshjustej, finished genesis of the Cyprian question by its exarticulation interethnic konfliktogennoj cores from anticolonial or national-osvoboditelnogo99 a context of time, the following paragraph is devoted studying of the maintenance and a course of preparation of these.
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A source: Bredikhin, Oleg Nikolaevich. Cyprus conflict: the genesis and the main stages of development / thesis / Moscow. 2006

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